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This thesis focuses on the present relationship between the Czech Republic and
the Federal Republic of Germany regarding the post-World War II transfer of Germans
from Czechoslovakia to Germany. The new approach to this issue appeared after the fall
of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia in 1989. The Sudeten German issue started
to be openly discussed again, and both countries tried to solve this issue by negotiating
and creating the Czech-German Declaration; however, this did not bring the
reconciliation process to the end.
This thesis describes the life of Czech and German nations within the Central
European region since the thirteenth century and shows some important events of their
common history. The thesis discusses the problem of nationalism, which started to
increase from the beginning of the nineteenth century, and became a widespread political
problem.
In 1998, both the German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder and Czech Prime
Minister Milos Zeman backed the 1997 declaration statement by agreeing their countries
would not encumber their relations with the past. However, German opposition, as well
as the Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft, opposed these statements and conditioned the
European Union membership for the Czech Republic by solving Sudeten German issue
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This thesis, Czech-German Sudeten relations: Reconciliation process between
two nations examines the problem of nationalism developed and increased from the
beginning of the nineteenth century. This thesis also discusses the important historical
events in Czech-German history and focuses especially on post-World War II transfer of
the German population from Czechoslovakia, and on the process of reconciliation in
Czech-German relations after the so-called "Velvet Revolution" in Czechoslovakia in
1989.
Initially, this thesis points out the common background of Czechs and Germans
and discusses the reasons or causes of their disagreements and present disputes. This
thesis then shows the important role nationalism played in common Czech-German
history and examines the possibility to settle the Czech-German issue, particularly Czech-
Sudeten German one. The thesis examines the process of the creation of the Czech-
German declaration and other events, which influenced and shaped current mutual
Czech-German relations.
To explore this subject, this thesis adopts and uses the theories as espoused by the
authors of comprehensive and perceptive works on this topic: first, the theory of
nationalism as described in Peter Alter's book, Nationalism, and in the work of Hagen
Schulze, States, Nations and Nationalism; second, the theory of the systematic
comparative analyses of the democratic process of consolidation in post-Communist
Europe, in this case especially valid for transition (democratization) in Czechoslovakia
XI
after the revolution in 1989, as presented in book of Juan L. Linz and Alfred Stepan,.
Problems ofDemocratic Transition and Consolidation.
The introductory chapter of this thesis discusses briefly the Czech-German
relations throughout the common history and shows the current situation in these
relations. The second chapter briefly outlines and discusses historical background of
Czech and German relations since the thirteenth century until the end of the communist
regime in Czechoslovakia. This historical knowledge is significant for understanding the
main issue of this study. The period after World War II is essential for current disputes,
claims, and the entire process of reconciliation.
The third chapter deals with the period of Czechoslovak transition to democracy
and discourses development of the mutual Czech-German relation with regard to the
Sudeten German issue. It shows two different opinions on common history and two
points of view on the results of the reconciliation process. The fourth chapter discusses
the political parties in the Czech Republic as well as in the Federal Republic of Germany
and analyses their approaches, their roles and attitudes during the process of creating the
Czech-Germany declaration and, later, after signing of that declaration. It points out how
the political parties are willing to continue in the reconciliation process and willing to
find a final solution.
Finally, the last chapter summarizes the current situation in Czech-German
relations and gives recommendations to the Czech side on what to do to cover the entire
scale of possible topics related to the Sudeten German issue. The recommendations offer
a solution which would contribute to the overall reconciliation process.
Xll
The main Czech interest and goal is to be accepted as a member of the European
Union and to be integrated into the political and economic structures of the European
Union. This is the future objective related to solving Czech-Sudeten German issue after
achieving the goal to become part of the Western political and military defense structure.
Although the situation of mutual Czech-German relations looks good thanks to the good
relations between leaders of both governments, the Czech-German issue regarding the
Sudeten German expulsion is still open. Cooperation between the Czech Republic and the
Federal Republic of Germany should be based on mutual positive facts from history and
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On 17 November 1989, a window of opportunity opened for Czechoslovakia and
consequently, following the separation of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic in
1993, for the Czech Republic to become a democratic European country, thus resuming a
democracy first broken by World War II and then by more than forty years of the
Communist rule. The end of the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia meant a change of
political system and led to changes in attitudes and approaches in foreign policy towards
its western neighbor. Within this process, relations between the Czech Republic and the
Federal Republic of Germany are a very special consideration in the area of Czech
foreign affairs, and they form the subject of this thesis.
People of both nations, Czechs and Germans, lived together in relative harmony
within one region and later within one empire for many centuries. They had lived within
a common geographical region, but within different kingdoms or empires and under
different rulers. Since the sixteenth century, they lived together within the Habsburg
Empire under one emperor. At the beginning of seventeenth century, disputes over
religion between Catholic German rulers and Protestant Czechs led to the Thirty Years
War from 1618 to 1648. The Czechs were defeated; consequently they were forced to
convert to the Catholic religion. However, a lot of them left the country instead of being
converted. Following the outcome of the war, the most important empire offices were
moved to Vienna, and Czechs, as well as other minorities within the Habsburg Empire,
had to learn the German language. Furthermore, the Bohemian crown lands were highly
influenced by Habsburg policy and military activities.
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the system of crown lands meant
difficult problems in solving the national issue. The crown lands became a source of
conflict with both the economic and the national claims because they divided people with
the same culture and nationality. In individual crown lands, the nation in the majority
tried to dominate other minority nations, and get and maintain certain privileges. This
was the central reason for national struggles and rivalries. 1
From the end of the eighteenth century on, significant contributions of the Slavic
renaissance strengthened a national consciousness among the people of Bohemia. This
process of the national awakening was started by the so-called "awakeners", poets,
writers, historians, etc., who re-created the national language because the rulers in the
multinational empire did not care about minorities and suppressed them, including their
languages. The Czech and Slovak languages existed only as a peasant dialect - not being
respected as national languages.
2
This situation changed during the enlightened rule of
Empress Maria Theresa, and the Czechs started to revise and reconstruct their own
language. Czech historians of that time looked back to the Hussite period and the time of
the George of Podebrady rule and stressed that period as the most significant time in
Czech history. They also emphasized John Hus, John Zizka, and George of Podebrady as
Czech heroes who had fought for the Czech nation. Therefore the first national groups
were based on traditions of medieval societal differences. In the early nineteenth century,
national "awakeners" also expressed and enforced the nation's claims for independence
1
Jaszi, Oscar, The dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy, 4
th
ed., (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1966), p.292.
2
Alter, Peter, Nationalism, 2nd ed., (London: Edward Arnold, a division of Hodder Headline PLC, 1994),
p.43.
and self-determination as following the general trend in Europe after the French
revolution.
3
Nationalism played a very important role among all national groups, not only
within their domestic order but also in their attitudes and relationship toward the empire.
Czech nationalists had a strong feeling of national identity and consciousness, and
nationalism started to become a widespread political problem, especially under the
influence of the Slavs and with the recognition of the ethnic factor.4 Additionally, Slavic
national sentiment and consciousness increased when the Slavs discovered they were the
most numerous nation in Europe. Czechs built their identity in contrast to German
speakers in the Bohemia crown lands within the Habsburg Empire where Czechs and
Germans lived together as a result of the German colonization of the middle ages. Most
of the urban population spoke German, but the rural people and nobility spoke Czech.5
The revolutionary year of 1848 brought an acceleration in the divergent path of
the Czechs and the Germans of the crown lands within the frame of the Habsburg
Empire. There was a tendency from the Slav side to set themselves apart in a national
sense from their western neighbor and to establish their own national character by
"contrasting with the German adversary."6 Delegates of the international Slav Congress
proposed an idea that the German domination of the Habsburg Empire should end and a
3
Ibid., p. 16.
4 Kann Robert A, History of the Habsburg Empire 1526-1918, (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1974),pp.290-91.
5
Schulze, Hagen, States, Nations and Nationalism, (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1996), pp. 109-
110.
6
Brandt, Harm-Hinrich, "The Revolution of 1848 and the Problem of Central European Nationalities," in
Schulze, Hagen, ed., States, Nations and Nationalism, (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1996),
p.110.
state based on equal rights for all nations should be created.7 The year 1 848 meant a clear
Czech distance from the idea of forming one unified Slavic state, because the Czechs
opposed the concept of a Slav state dominated and directed by Russian Panslavism.8
The Czechs demanded an equal status for the Czech language with the German
language in Bohemia. The people of Bohemia, a lot of whom also spoke German,
rejected becoming a part of a German nation-state, which Germans of the Frankfurt
parliament of the Paulus Kirche wanted to create. The actual Bohemian historic territory
was not in accord with linguistic and ethnic national territory resulting in national
tensions and conflicts, which lasted through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries until
World Warn.
As the century wore on, and the conflicts of nationalities within the Habsburg
Empire increased, the Czechs claimed that they were increasingly oppressed by German
directed centralism. As a result, they made an effort to get autonomy by demanding
Czech political dominance according to the medieval concept of a Bohemian state and a
possible Czech-German separation. The Czechs claimed that they were equally important
and politically at the same level as the Hungarians, but they had been under a stronger
state control. Czechs demands for equality or autonomy were seen as a major goal and
represented the most important political opinion before 1867.
In March 1867, after the Habsburgs were defeated at Koniggratz at the hands of
the Prussians, the Magyars and the Austrian Habsburgs re-arranged the empire as a
constitutional monarchy. This new form of government became the site of increasing
Schulze, Hagen, States, Nations and Nationalism, (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1996), p.212.
8
Kann, Robert, A., History of the Habsburg Empire 1526-1918, (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1974), p.292.
nationalist strife in which the fate of the Czechs, within the Austrian part of the empire -
cisleithenia - emerged as a constant issue until the outbreak of the war in 1914.
Capitulation of Germany and the defeat of its ally, Austria-Hungary, in the fall
1918 contributed to the dissolution of the Austria-Hungary Empire and the creation of
new states. When the Czechoslovak Republic was created in 1918, the Czech pursuit of
national sovereignty was on top, and although the newly created Czechoslovakia was a
multinational state, the Czechs considered it as restoration of their statehood after three
hundred years of Habsburg rule. They saw it as an instrument for the realization of Czech
interests and its actual ethnic policy gave full credence to do this.9
Czechoslovakia became a multinational state in which the nationality issues that
had existed before 1918 in the empire continued in amended form in the new nation state.
The Czechs constituted a ruling majority and Germans became the minority. German
Social Democrats and also German nationalists were becoming followers of the right of
nations for self-determination. They accepted the right of other nations to create their
own states, but they also wanted to stay as part of German-Austria and not become a
minority within a newly born state. The remnants of German Austria wanted annexation
("anschluss") from what became known as the Weimar Republic, a desire which
frustrated the victors after 1919, while Sudeten Germans wanted annexation from their
brethren in Germany. The Nazis later seized upon this impulse as the first Austrian
Republic to be dwindled politically and Nazi German power increased after 1935.
The situation in Czechoslovakia between the two World Wars, especially events
before the outbreak of World War II, was significant for future relations between both
9
Holy, Ladislav, The little Czech and the great Czech nation, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996), p.57.
nations. Before World War n, German minority inhabited the Czechoslovak borderlands
to Germany and Austria of 1919-1938. After the rise of the Nazi movement, and Hitler's
gain of power in Germany in 1933, an increased wave of nationalism within the German
minority was evident. Hitler put pressure on Czechoslovakia by pushing the issue of
national self-determination for three million Germans living in the Czechoslovak
borderland. He also claimed that the post-World War I settlement was not correct because
it put these German speaking people inside the Czechoslovak territory and violated their
right of self-determination. This territory was strategically and militarily important for
Hitler because it consisted of the Bohemia mountain massive, a Czech natural defense
line where military fortifications similar to the French Maginot Line were erected. After
the Munich Agreement in 1938, Czechoslovakia was partitioned and the Sudetenland
became a part of Germany. Inhabitants with Czech nationality were forced to leave the
Sudetenland. After the end of World War n, the Czechoslovak President Benes issued
decrees which - inter alia - meant confiscation of German and Hungarian properties and
the loss of Czechoslovak citizenship for these two minorities, unless these Germans and
Hungarians proved they actively fought nazism. Based on the Potsdam Agreement, about
two and half million Germans were transferred from Czechoslovakia to Germany. It was
considered an act to prevent repetition of the 1938 Munich event.
After the Communist coup d'etat in February 1948, the political life in
Czechoslovakia was affected by the communist political model where the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches were substituted by the leading role of the Communist
Party. The party dominance was institutionalized by a Stalinist constitution put in hand
after 1948. During that period, when Czechoslovakia was under the communist regime,
the question of mutual relations regarding the Sudeten German issue was not openly
mentioned in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. West Germany was considered as
ideological enemy and the transfer of Sudeten Germans was thought of as the right thing.
The situation with "East Germany" was different. In 1950, Czechoslovakia and the
German Democratic Republic (GDR) signed a declaration that both countries did not
have any territorial or border requirements with each other, and the transfer of Germans
was unchangeable, just, and definitively solved.
10
Both countries cooperated militarily
within the Warsaw Pact, and the German Armed Forces was one of the forces which
came to suppress the Czechoslovak democratic tendency, so-called "Prague Spring", in
1968. Mutual cooperation also developed within the economic area, and Czechoslovakia
became the third biggest export/import partner of GDR.
The mutual relation between Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSSR) and the
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was not changed until the late 1960s when the
German Social Democratic government of Willy Brant ended the confrontational policy
toward the Central and Eastern European Communist countries. The breakthrough of
Czech-German relations occurred in 1973 when CSSR and FRG signed the Treaty on
Mutual Relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic. After this, cooperation also started to develop.
The so-called "Velvet Revolution" resulted in the end of the Communist regime in
Czechoslovakia in 1989. It brought on a change of the political elite, which had different
opinions on foreign affairs issues. The Communist political regime broke down together
with its political party system. Because the previous regime oppressed and banned almost
10 Smutny, Jaromir, Svedectvi presidentova kanclefe, (Prague: Mlada fronta, 1996), p.298.
all political parties, it was necessary to restore a democratic political system with a
diversity of political parties, which had been disrupted more than fifty years ago. The
new Czech political representatives were willing to settle the long-term issue of Czech-
German relations. The newly elected Czech president, Vaclav Havel, played a leading
role among them and his apology to expelled Germans for lawlessness, committed in
1945-46, meant a turn in Czech-German relations. But his approach to this issue changed
during his ten-year presidency, and in 1999 he stood on the side of the defenders of
Benes's decrees. He was criticized for making the first step towards Czech-German
reconciliation; however, he did not continue in this effort and did not do anything in
practice to help find a solution for the Sudeten German issue.
Another opinion, which helped to start the Czech-German negotiating process,
was the belief that if Czechoslovakia wanted "to return to Europe" and become once
again one of the full democratic states, it would have to first settle its "old debts" with
Germany. It was stressed that resolving the Sudeten German issue was one of the most
important problems, because without establishing a good relationship with its closest
western neighbor, Czechoslovakia could not be included in democratic Europe. The
Czech politicians, mostly dissidents or exiles, knowing the opinions and points of view
from the western side, thought this process could be easily and smoothly completed. Yet
the majority of the Czech population was influenced by the former communist regime
propaganda and was not willing to accept the Czech side apologizing to Germany for
unlawful events, which happened in 1945-46.
Some attempts were made to solve this so long-lasting issue and to make relations
with Germany friendlier. In 1992, the Czech-German Agreement was signed and in 1995,
Czech President Havel said that there had been enough apologizing, and it was time to
take some actions to solve the problem. He indirectly initiated the process of the creation
of the Czech-German Declaration. It was thought and hoped, from the Czech side, that it
would be "a definitive full stop" after the Czech-German history. The Czech-German
declaration itself did not really help to improve the mutual relations between both
countries, because it did not solve the problem of Sudeten German claims. Basically, both
countries stated that they would not encumber their mutual future relations with this
issue, and there were different opinions on this issue because of different legal systems
and norms in each country. Additionally, the question of compensation and possible
return of confiscated property to expelled Sudeten Germans was not solved and remained
open. All of this did not contribute to the intended settlement of the "conflict" between
Czechs and Germans, but instead went the other way around.
The opinion towards this issue slowly changed under influence of the stream of
news, reports, and books about this topic. In May 1996, eighty-six percent of the Czech
population was against any kind of apology or negotiation with Germans; however, in
December 1996, fifty-three percent of Czechs supported the declaration, though it did not
contain any solution of the Sudeten German claims.
Expelled Sudeten Germans expressed two opportunities to force the Czech
Republic to accept Sudeten German demands. They said that Czech membership in
NATO or in the European Union could be blocked by Germany until the Czech-Sudeten
German issue was solved. During the ratification process of the Czech Republic, Poland,
and Hungary NATO membership in German Bundestag, CSU and Sudetendeutsche
Landsmannschaft representatives publicly commented that the Czech Republic had not
solved the Sudeten German issue, so its membership could be refused. Eventually the
Czech Republic became a NATO member in March 1999; nevertheless, Sudetendeutsche
Landsmannschaft leaders stated that there would be enough opportunities to enforce
Sudeten German interests in connection with the Czech Republic. One opportunity they
considered was the Czech wish to join European Union (EU), which would also need to
be approved by all member countries.
The Czech Republic is trying to become a European Union member and German
government representatives and leaders of German political parties officially gave their
full support for Czech membership in the EU. However, there were non-supportive
voices, especially from the Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft side, which conditioned a
Czech membership on solving the Sudeten German problem.
In 1998, the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Czech Social
Democratic Party (CSSD) won elections in each of the countries and formed
governments. Their representatives, the German Chancellor and the Czech Prime
Minister, backed the 1997 declaration, specifically its statement that both countries would
not encumber their relations with the past. The German Chancellor said that the expellee
organizations could not influence German foreign policy and the German federal
government would not raise any property claims towards the Czech Republic. 11 The
German opposition parties as well as the Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft
representatives, strongly opposed that statement.
Although the situation in mutual Czech-German relations looks very good thanks
to the good relations between leaders of both governments, the Czech-German issue
11
Palata, LuboS, "Zeman a Schroder udelali tecku za tezkou minulosu', (Zeman and Schroder Made a
Period After the Difficult Past)," Mlada fronta DNES, 9 March 1999.
10
regarding the Sudeten German expulsion is still open. The Czech republic can expect
difficulties and pressure from some German parties and organizations to solve this topic
as the condition for its European Union membership. Even the EU itself can create some
pressure on the Czech Republic to abandon the Benes's decrees, allegedly inhuman and
not in accordance with the modern European legal system.
What is the future of Czech-German relations under the present situation and the
present Czech government of Social Democrats, which did not strongly support the final
version of the Czech-German declaration? Can the Czechs change their minds and
opinions about Germany once again wanting to conquer their country, or does the vision
of prosperity and common cooperation with powerful Germany within Europe and the
European Union prevail? Can the Czech Republic and Germany reach a two-sided
justified agreement about the past without future claims and make a bold line after the
past heading toward a common future without further "Sudetenland" disputes? These are
some of the questions which really matter for these two countries and which should be




II. HISTORY OF THE CZECH-GERMAN RELATIONS
This second chapter briefly outlines and discusses history of Czech and German
relations since the thirteenth century until the end of the communist regime in
Czechoslovakia. It will point out some important issues and historical events in common
Czech-German history. The history of Czech and German relations started in the pre-
national period when the antecedents of Czechs and Germans lived relatively harmonious
with each other.
The first part discusses history of the Bohemian crown lands and their relations
with the Habsburg Empire. In early nineteenth century, modern nationalism, as an
ideology described self-determination and equality and supported the demands for
independent statehood with its legislature. 12 The collective process of the "national
awakening" started with "awakeners", such as philologists, poets, politicians and
historians who recognizably and mostly successfully enforced the nation's claims for
independence and self-determination. 13 This was the starting point for disputes between
Czechs who claimed independence and Germans who ruled the country. Disputes and
nationalist issues lasted over the next hundred and fifty years.
The second part of the chapter shows important events in the nineteenth century,
especially in the revolutionary years 1848 and 1867. The third part describes the situation
12





from the beginning of the twentieth century until World War II, including the
establishment of independent Czechoslovakia in 1918. The last part discusses the
situation from the end of World War II until the fall of the communist regime in
Czechoslovakia in 1989.
A. HISTORY FROM THE THIRTEENTH TO NINETEENTH CENTURY
The nationality and national minority issue of the struggle between Czechs and
Germans was not resolved through the centuries and it later improved and stressed main
problems of Czech development within the new union - the Habsburg Empire. The
Habsburgs ruled over a huge territory and their empire included many nations, of which
the Czechs were only one. This Habsburg rule lasted several centuries, exactly from the
sixteenth century until 1918. They ruled by the law of hereditary succession in the
German lands; whereas, in the Bohemian crown lands, they ruled by election through the
estates until 1620 after which, hereditary succession in the Bohemian lands remained by
law.
14
The first union between Bohemian and German lands under Rudolf III in 1306-
1307 was an important connection between the king's accession and the extinction of the
Premyslids who had ruled in Bohemia for four centuries. The Premyslids, raised to
royalty by the German king, Philip of Swabia, at the end of twelfth century, continued in
a policy of close relations with the empire and enabled a flow of German culture into the
Bohemian lands. In the thirteenth century, expansionist policies of Premysl Ottokar II,
the new king of Bohemia, created new circumstances. In 1273, the princes of the empire
14
Kann, Robert A., History of the Habsburg Empire 1526-1918, (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1974), p.3.
14
elected as a king, Rudolf of Habsburg. Ottokar IPs aspirations to the Holy Roman Empire
ended by the great battle of Durnkmt in 1278, his defeat by Rudolf, the joint accession of
Rudolfs son in the Austrian lands and in Styria in 1282, and the following succession of
the Luxembourgs to the Bohemian throne in 1310. The Habsburgs, a new German
dynasty, strengthened the German impact in Central Europe. German national-oriented
historiography shows that the breakdown of Ottokar's great plans for establishing his
Czech dynasty rule in Austrian lands stopped a complete Germanization of the Bohemian
crown lands. "Ottokar n with German help might have advanced Czech economic and
cultural development faster and perhaps further had he not been stopped by Rudolf." 15
However, there is no clear evidence for that.
The supreme Habsburg rule in the following centuries strengthened Germanic
influence. On the other hand, this influence was not created only by Habsburgs, but also
by the social and cultural influence of Czechs, Magyars, Slovaks, Italians, and other
nationalities in this region.
16
Quite close ties between the Bohemian and German hereditary lands had existed
as long as the German-Luxembourg rulers supported the cultural center in Prague. They
valued both the imperial crown and the Czech national tradition and also added new
regions to Bohemian lands named the Crownlands of Bohemia. 17 The Emperor Charles
IV succeeded in getting the synthesis between Czech and German institutions, and
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power and also a cultural center. Under the last Luxembourg king, Vaclav IV, the
combination of a Bohemian geographic position and a central power position, in relation
to the empire and together with the religious aspect of the Hussite movement, led into a
conflict between Czechs and Germans. The Hussite wars and the social struggle in
Bohemia constrained cultural relations with the Habsburg Empire.
The equal status with electors was already demanded by Charles TV's son-in-law
Duke Rudolf IV. There was a controversial discussion as to whether the king of Bohemia
should be considered an empire prince like other German electoral princes. This question
was solved in 1356 when Charles IV, and later both his sons, succeeded the empire as
well as Bohemia. "These constitutional developments raised the status of the Bohemian
king as genuine royalty in relations to the German princes." 18 But this relationship
limited the freedom of the Bohemian ruler because now, the Bohemia crown lands were
closely tied to the empire.
In the fifteenth century, Albrecht II's brief reign was a significant event because of
his marriage to the daughter of the last Luxembourg emperor, who was a ruler of the
Bohemian crown lands. This marriage established the long-range Habsburg claims to the
Bohemian crown lands. The long reign of Frederick in, the next Habsburg ruler, was
filled by a continuous struggle to get a Bohemian heritage crown. First, his claim was
blocked by Albrecht's late-born son, Ladislav Posthumus, and later by George of
Podebrady, the powerful Hussite regent who lately became a truly national Bohemian
king. If Frederich HI had not had the personal aspiration, the union could have been
18
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established in the mid-fifteenth century. There were two reasons for the union. First, the
threat of the advancing Turks and second, Albrecht's contested rule in Bohemia. 19
The Bohemian crown lands had been under Habsburg rule twice, in 1306 - 1307
and 1437 - 1439; the Habsburg king in Bohemia participated in the imperial elections
only in a formal sense. When Ferdinand succeeded to the Bohemian crown in 1526 and
the Bohemian lands joined the Habsburg Empire, the union of imperial and Bohemian
crowns was established in the same person, the Bohemian ruler was definitely
subordinated to the imperial ruler, and the lands were ruled and oriented by Germans.
The Catholicism established common ties between new and old Habsburg lands, but it
could do so only at the price of humiliating and alienating the Czech people for centuries
to come.
20 Consequences of all these developments, especially in the Bohemian lands,
were apparent until 1918 and beyond.
Before 1600, the progress of the Christian religion in the north was quite limited.
Ferdinand I21 felt that tolerance was the best way to deal with the issue of religious
diversity. His successors, Maximilian n, Rudolf II, and Mathias, who ruled from 1564 to
1619, showed sympathy for Protestantism. It changed when Ferdinand II succeeded to the
Bohemian throne in 1617 and assumed the Austrian titles and Hungarian crown together
with his election as Holy Roman Emperor in 1619. He was loyal to Rome and he
identified the mission of Habsburg dynasty with the Roman Church and Roman






Ferdinand I was the archduke of Austria, king of Bohemia, King of Hungary, and after 1555 Habsburg
Holy Roman Emperor of the German nation.
17
realm in the name of God. Ferdinand II possessed several realms, each of them had its
own feudal estates with their traditions, institutions, and interests. Additionally, most of
the Ferdinand's subjects were Protestants and they reinforced traditional aversion to royal
centralization. If the dynasty wanted to increase its power, it was only possible at the
expense of these feudal estates. 22
The crises between Protestants and Catholics deepened in the beginning of the
seventeenth century when the Duke of Bavaria, Maximilian, started to occupy the
Protestant free cities. This led to the distraction of Religious Peace of Augsburg of 1555
between Protestant and Catholic princes and the emperor whose interests were closer to
the Catholic princes. Bohemia and Moravia were part of the alliance against Maximilian.
Additionally, the Protestant Czech estates demanded wider autonomy in 1615. Ferdinand,
before his election as a Bohemian king, had pledged to abide the Letter of Majesty issued
by Rudolf II that granted freedom of conscience to all inhabitants of Bohemia, but he did
not keep his promise. Violation of the Letter of Majesty was a good reason for
Bohemian rebels to protest against the German ruler. The defenestration of the royal
governors in 1618 was the first act of protest. In 1618, the Bohemian nobility decided
that Ferdinand II had violated their rights, so they renounced the crown, established a
directory of thirty aristocrats to rule the land, and then elected a German Protestant prince
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Frederick V king of Bohemia. This Bohemian crisis had led the Habsburgs directly into
the war, which lasted thirty years (so-called the Thirty Years War).24
The Bohemian estates were determined to fight for their liberties but they were
defeated in the battle of White Mountain and Ferdinand II proceeded with the
dismantling of Bohemian independence. Twenty seven uprising leaders of the Bohemian
nation, including German nobles, were put on trial and beheaded.
The Westphalian Peace Treaty in 1648 did not affect the Habsburgs lands so
much because it lost only domains in Alsace, Sundgau, and Vorlande; however, the
Bohemian crown lands were the biggest loser because they were devastated, only 5,000
towns remained from the previous 35,000 prosperous ones, and were among territories
where the Protestants were expelled or had to go underground. The Czechs lost their
crown, most of their nobility, and their religion. They later referred to the period after the
battle of White Mountain as "the time of darkness." About 150,000 people emigrated
Oft
because of religious or political reasons. John Amos Comenius called "the teacher of
nations" in Czech history, left Bohemia in 1627 rather than to be converted to
Catholicism. When he was leaving he said that after the storm of anger the Czech people
would again achieve mastery of their own fate. 27 German Catholic immigrants settled the
24
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lands abandoned by the Czech Protestant emigrants and constituted the wave of
28
Germanization in Bohemia. The Bohemian throne became hereditary right to
Habsburgs, and the most important governmental offices were transferred to Vienna.
Bohemian crown lands were highly influenced by German Habsburg policy and
military activities. In 1741, Maria Theresa of Austria and Frederick II of Prussia had
signed the secret pact in which Austria had to give up Lower Silesia to Prussia after an
unsuccessful Austrian military campaign. In the summer of 1742, Austria also lost Upper
Silesia. The Bohemian estates were conscious of their reduction in political status and
influence after the Battle of the White Mountain; therefore, they significantly supported
Albert of Bavaria against the Habsburgs in 1741-1742. His Bavarian forces occupied
Bohemia, but in 1742 they were forced to withdraw and Bohemian estates accepted
renewed Habsburg rule. In 1744, Prussian king Frederick II worried that Austria had
almost recovered and could take back the Silesian land, so he established an alliance with
France. Then in August of 1744, his troops marched through Saxony into Bohemia. After
severe and costly fighting, a peace accord was signed in 1745 and Frederick II left the
plans to conquer Bohemia. 29 Habsburgs succeeded in the War of the Austrian Succession
and reestablished their rule in the empire partly because the individual anti-Habsburg
members did not consider it valuable enough to fight and to suffer for the disintegration
of the empire. As the independent elements, they were aware that they would have to face
such results as control of Bohemia by Bavaria, or Hungary by Turks.
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The reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph II in the second half of the eighteenth
century resulted in some positive aspects; for example, Bohemia and the margravate
Moravia became independent of the Habsburg Empire. The negative aspect of the
reforms was the benefit for the centralization of power and Germanization.
B. EVENTS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
Bohemia had been linguistically divided as a result of the German colonization of
the eastern territories in the twelfth and thirteen centuries and later in seventeenth
century. Most of the urban population spoke German, while the rural people and nobility
spoke Czech. There was a tendency from the Slav side to set themselves apart in a
national sense from their western neighbor and to establish their own national character
by contrasting with the German foe.
The system of crown lands meant difficult problems in solving national issues.
Crown lands became a source of conflict with both the economic and the national claims
because they divided people of the same culture and nationality. In individual crown
lands, the nation with the majority tried to dominate over other minority nations and to
obtain and maintain certain privileges. This was the reason why there were national
struggles and rivalries. 31
During the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century, the influence of
the Church on elementary and intermediate education, under state supervision, was
strengthened. The purely administrative aspects of elementary education showed some
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improvement because the parish priests and ecclesiastical deans were now entrusted by
the state with full supervision of education in their districts. Clerical control was on the
rise and censorship was tightened. Slight progress could be seen in the establishment of
technical colleges of university level in Prague in 1812 and in Vienna in 1815.
Technological progress in industry was slow, even though the textile manufacture in
Bohemian lands and in Lower Austria, the best-developed Austrian industry, profited
from the Continental Blockade. 32
The Czech historians of romantic nationalism in that time looked back to the
Hussite period, George of Podebrady's reign, and the rise of the Unity of Czech Brothers
as the light period of Czech history. The fiction was that Slavs in different countries, such
as Russia, Austria, Prussia, spoke dialects of one Slavic language and that they formed
one nation. This idea and the fact that the Slavs found themselves as the most numerous
nation in Europe awakened national sentiment and strengthened Slavic consciousness.33
The development and the use of the Czech language were severely restricted after the
Battle of the White Mountain because the rulers and the governments in multinational
empires follow the policy of discrimination and uniformity. The situation gradually
changed and the Czechs started to revise and rebuild their language during the
enlightened era of Maria Theresa. In 1769, some enlightened aristocrats, such as Prince
K. E. Furstenberg, Count E. Waldstein, Count F. J. Kinsky, founded a society for the
study of so-called Bohemian culture. In 1789, Vaclav Matej Kramerius published the first
32
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Czech revival newspaper. 34 In many cases, "awakeners", philologists, poets, politicians,
historians, etc. who enforced the nation's claims for independence and self-determination,
were also re-creators of the Czech language. Czech or Slovak languages existed only as
peasant dialects and not as national languages. 35 In the revolutionary year of 1848, the
Czech language movement demanded an equal status to the German language in
Bohemia.
The person who really contributed to the Czech Slavic renaissance was a former
Jesuit priest, Josef Dobrovsky. He considered Czech to be his mother tongue but due to
external suppression and clerical education, his command of the native language was
limited causing him to write most of his work in German. His contribution in that period
of time was very significant because of his work in the field of general Slavic studies. 36
Another contributor to the Czech resurgence was Josef Jungman whose work had more
specific value because he wrote in the Czech language. 37 As a result of his great efforts,
the authorities finally allowed the teaching of the Czech language in secondary schools.
There were also other important persons who contributed to the rebirth of the Czech
language and culture, such as Frantisek Ladislav Celakovsky, collector of ancient
34
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folksongs, Pavel Josef Safafik, expert on Slavic medieval history and ethnography, and
Frantisek Palacky, writer and distinguished leader on the question of national reform. 38
There were debates and disagreements about the Prague University, one of the
oldest universities in the Central Europe, founded by Emperor Charles IV in 1348. The
Germans claimed it to be a German establishment and the Czechs claimed the opposite.
It was run as a German institution until 1882 when a Czech university with Czech as the
language of instruction was added. There was also development of theatrical life, music,
and other arts in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 3 In proportion to the much
larger Czech population, Czech theatrical life was at a disadvantage compared to the
German one.40 In the 1820s and 1830s, the Czech and Slovak national consciousness had
not yet crystallized.
Czech and Austrian culture were interrelated because Germans and Czechs had
lived together for many centuries. The intensified national conflict between the two
nations after the revolution in 1 848 did not restrained the cultural interchange.
1. Events of 1848
The new and important cultural contributions of the Slavic renaissance and the
changes in the nationalist ideologies were made from the last quarter of the eighteenth
38
Palacky wrote the history of the Bohemian people to 1526, first in German and then in Czech. As a
collector of the documents about Hussite wars, he surpassed in scholarly quality contemporary Magyar and
Austria-German historiography. Kann, Robert A., History of the Habsburg Empire 1526-1918, (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1974), p.385.
i9
In 1783, the German National Theater was opened and lately renamed on the Theater of the Bohemian
Estates or the Estates National Theater. Interim Czech National Theater was opened in 1862. The great
Bohemian National Theater for plays and operas was built between 1868 and 1891. In 1881, the new
German Theater, whose construction as counterweight to the Czech institution was furthered by the Vienna
government, was opened. Another German theater was opened in Brno in 1882.
40
Kann, Robert A., History of the Habsburg Empire 1526-1918, (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1974), p.386.
24
century to the half of the nineteenth century. The Slavic renaissance strengthened
national consciousness among several national groups. The first national groups with a
political history were based on traditions of medieval societal differences and possessed a
strong sense of national identity and consciousness. Nationalism played an important role
among national groups within their domestic order, as well as in their relationship to the
empire. Nationalism started to become a political problem for all national groups,
especially under the influence of the Slavic renaissance and with the recognition of the
ethnic factor.
41
This became obvious during the political confrontation of the revolution
of 1848-1849.
In the nineteenth century, the voices against German rule intensified. State
supervision, conditions in the educational system, and censorship contributed to
revolutionary upheaval. The year 1848 was a year of the first great manifestation of Pan-
Slavism which Czech leaders of the 1840s brought into Austro-Slavism. The Austrian
Slavs joined the general western liberalism and political equality movement. 42
Nationalism, after the French Revolution, was one of the most powerful ideologies
"... the destroyer and creator of states, the bearer of strong emotions and aspirations, the
mover or feelings of solidarity, sacrifice, and hatred." 43
The aspects of the Czech national struggle in Austria were that the programs and
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44 The Slav-speaking people in Bohemia called themselves Czechs and
included all inhabitants of Bohemia, although there was a large group of people who
were Germans. People of Moravia called themselves Moravians and slowly learnt to
identify themselves as a Czech people.45 The fact that moderate progress was not
accompanied by social legislation led to serious disturbances in Vienna, Prague, Pilsen,
and other places during the economic crisis between 1845 and 1848.
The police reported the political attitude of individuals to the regime. The main
task and goal of the police under its chief, Count Joseph Sedlnitzky,46 was to control the
spread of even slightly liberal thoughts or potentially revolutionary ideas. Some
Franciscan bureaucrats, particularly in the Bohemian lands, like Count Franz Anton
Kolowrat, opposed this strict censorship system; however, Sedlnitzky 's policies, backed
by Metternich, dominated until the 1848 revolution.47
The great Czech historian, Frantisek Palacky was considered as a representative
not only of all Slavs, but also of all non-Germanic people who were not recognized
within the multinational German empire. He refused in his letter in April 1 848 any Czech
participation in the "Vorparlament" and consequently in the German National Assembly.
The international Slav Congress was organized under the Palacky chairmanship in Prague
on 2 June 1848. Congress approved his letter to the Austrian Emperor. Czech nationalists
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in Prague were highly interested in constitutional government and recognition of equality
with the Germans. The delegates expressed an idea that the German domination of the
Habsburg Empire should end and that there should be a constituted federative state based
on equal rights for all the nations.
48
When Palacky returned from his journey from Poland and Russia he wrote an
article entitled "the Slavs and the Czechs." Palacky's opinion was that the name Slav was
and should forever remained in a purely geographical and scientific sense. He thought
that nationality was determined not only by language, but also by customs, religion, form
of government, state of education, sympathies, and other features.49 In his opinion,
Russians' and Poles' desires were to use Pan-Slavism only as an idea on how to use other
Slavs for their own purposes. He said that Czechs did not want to be Germans, Magyars,
or Russians, but they wanted to stay Czechs, and therefore they should be cool to the
Russians.
50 One of his arguments was that if the Habsburg Empire should become a true
multinational association of people with the same rights, people would have to be freed
from the German nationalistic pressures within the empire borders.
Palacky^ was afraid that unified Germany could bring Bohemia under its
domination. He also opposed czarist Russia and its form of Pan-Slavism. He saw the
chance for small nations living within the Austrian Empire if the Empire would be
48
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reformed into a federal state of autonomous democratic national states with a central
government and administration. 51
German endeavor to create a German state as a "Great Germany" failed in the
revolutionary years 1848-49. Delegates at the German Congress in St. Paul's Church in
Frankfurt on 18 May 1948 were divided in debate on what Germany should constitute
and who should be entitled to elect the national assembly. 52 Czechs responded with a
negative answer to the attempts to create a single unified German state in which they
would be a member. Also the Habsburgs were not willing to disband their empire
because of the idea of unified Germany.53
Relatively minor clashes between Czech nationalist and imperial troops were
considered as opportunity for the commanding general, Prince Alfred Windischgratz, to
dissolve the Congress by military force. This dissolution meant the end of a great hope
for Slavs. Revolutionary upheaval was also in the Hungarian part of the empire. The
Habsburgs sent troops, which had restored order in Italy, Bohemia, and Vienna to deal
with Hungarians at the beginning of 1849, but they were not successful. So, the
Habsburgs asked czarist Russia for assistance. The combined operation of Austrian and
Russian armies defeated the Hungarian revolutionary army and brought the end of the
Hungarian revolution. The Hungarians lost their old privileges.
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Outcome of revolution years, 1848-49 was that Bohemia, whose people mainly
spoke Czech, refused to become a part of the German nation-state and decided to stay
within the Habsburg Empire. Palacky did not believe that there was a place for the Czech
nation in a German nation-state. In Bohemia, where historic territory was not in accord
with linguistic and ethnic nationality, the "springtime of nations" resulted in national
conflicts. Tension did not disappear even after the Habsburg Empire split up and
remained up until World War II. 54
The comprehensive philosophy of the moderate Bohemian reformers overlapped
at some point with Panslav ideas. They expressed the desire for a political union of all
Slavic nations as equal partners, but this idea was hardly practically-executable. Another
not very popular idea was the concept of a Russian directed and dominated Panslavism
against which Palacky took a stand. When the Czech effort to get autonomy of the Czech
state failed, Palacky stated "we were here before Austria and we shall be here after it." 55
It meant leaving an idea of autonomy and starting the Czech struggle for independence.
2. Refusal of the Czech Rights in 1867
After 1848, the new generation of leaders in European powers brought new spirit
to European international policy. They were ambitious for their own countries and not
willing to follow principles of cooperation invented by a previous generation of
statesman. They fought wars with each other.56 Europe was in anarchy, and an old
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balance of the power system was abandoned. 57 There were some issues that influenced
struggles of the Habsburg Empire during this period of time, such as democratization of
government, the struggle for supremacy in Germany between Austria and Prussia, and
awakened Slavic interests.
The danger of Pan-Slavism made Germans angry and when the Czech national
aspiration issue came to the agenda, it was denounced as a result of Russian propaganda.
This offended the Slav nations of the monarchy, especially constitutionally and culturally
CO
developed Czechs. Czechs in the Bohemian lands claimed that they were equally
important and politically advanced as Magyars, but that they were the aim of a stronger
government control. According to the public opinions, German directed centralism was
increasingly oppressive and insufferable. Czechs cautiously stated the demand for Czech
political dominance according to the medieval concept of the Bohemian state with a view
of possible Czech-German separation. The Old Czech party considered this demand and
whole program as a final goal and a political view before the Austro-Hungarian
Compromise in 1867. However, it was primarily a view and interest of aristocratic
families who had settled in the Bohemia lands after 1620. 59 Count Joseph Thun and
historian Palack^ could be considered, in the pre-March period, spokesmen for these
views.
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Aristocratic families, such as the Colloredos, the Liechtensteins, the Clam Martinic, the Thuns, the
Schwarzenbergs, and others, were German aristocrats who had settled in the Bohemia lands. They had
never become Czech nationalists, but they remained in favor of a strengthened estate right in the land of the
Bohemian crown.
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The young Czech liberal writer and first Czech journalist, Karel Havlicek, and an
enlightened conservative and capable Bohemian aristocrat, Count Leo Thun60 were
politically more long-headed than the Panslavs. Havlicek's idea was the creation of a
separate democratic Czech political nation, which would get away from the Habsburg
absolutism, but which would be protected from tsarist-dominated Panslavism. Count
Thun thought that the best solution for the Czech demands was successive achievement
of equality with the Germans by incorporating bilingualism in mixed territories. This
would indeed greatly benefit the Czechs against Germans who were not willing to learn
the language of a small Slavic nation. Thun further thought about developing
multinational parties in Austria, which would be based on common political-social
interests.
61
Prussia and Austria had significantly different concerns within the German
Confederation after revolutionary years 1848-49. Austria wanted to maintain its
traditional interests and superiority in the Confederation that placed a restriction on the
ambitions of Prussia. Bismark, at that time Prussian Foreign Minister, challenged
Austrian seniority in the German Confederation. In 1866, he initiated an idea of German
Confederation revision, which would exclude Austria from the Confederation. In April
1866, conflict between Austria and Prussia had already introduced a motion for reform of
the Confederal assembly. The situation was solved on the battlefield and decisive battle
occurred near Koniggratz in Northern Bohemia on 21 June 1866. A Prussian superiority
in leadership, logistics, training, and weapon equipment led into an unambiguous
60 Thun was a governor of Bohemia in 1848. He was an excellent Austrian minister of education for the
following eleven years.
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Prussian victory. Through this battle, Austria not only lost the fight of supremacy in
Germany, but also had to leave German Confederation affairs,62 which was the
assumption for the creation of a Prussian dominated "kleindeutsch" (little Germany).
Hungarians benefited from Austrian defeat as well, because they used Austrian weakness
to ask for more national autonomy. They succeeded in obtaining the so-called
Compromise in 1867. It meant reestablishment of the Hungarian kingdom with
significant autonomy, as well as the recognition of the Dual Monarchy of Austria-
Hungary.63 The disastrous defeat by Prussia was connected to the failure of the absolutist
Bach regime. When Austrian Minister Balcredi resigned in February 1867, his concept of
an Austrian federation was not considered any more.
64
The compromise made between Austria and Hungary in March 1867 was
consequently passed by the Austrian parliament. The Habsburg Empire was transformed
into the dual Austria-Hungary Empire and constitutional monarchy as figure II- 1 shows.
The Czechs, the third biggest nationality within the Habsburg Empire, felt they had been
sold out because of a Habsburg endeavor to keep the empire undivided. Frantisek
Palacky, who was until that time a loyal Czech nationalist, participated in the Panslav
Congress, assembled in Moscow in May 1867. This congress was more hostile to
Austrian interests than the Prague Slavs Congress in 1848.
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The new Austrian parliament, which rallied in May 1867, had a two-thirds
German liberal majority against federalist opposition, largely consisting of Slavs
representatives. The compromise legislation could be passed only with full German
support obtained only for a price. This price was to be a constitutional law, which would
be subordinated to the wishes of the German liberals with respect to civil liberties, as well
as the maintenance of the German privileged position in Austria 65
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Figure II-l: A Map of the Austria-Hungary Empire in 1914
Source: Zeman, Zbynek, A. B., The break-up of the Habsburg empire 1914-1918, A study in national and
social revolution. New York, Octopus Books, 1977.
Some laws, which offered basic rights of the citizens, were passed but a law
relating to national rights was not. The most important provisional law, (Statute 142 of
1867) article 19, dealt with the national problem. This article broadly stated possible




All ethnic groups (Volksstamme) in the state have equal rights and
every ethnic group has the inviolable right to preserve and cultivate its
nationality and language.
The equality of all languages customary in the crownlands
(Landesubliche sprachen) is recognized in schools, government agencies,
and public life.
In the lands inhabited by several ethnic groups, the public schools shall
be organized in a way that every ethnic group receives the necessary funds
of training in its own language without being compelled to learn the
second language of any land. 66
The real implication of this article was not as liberal as it seems to be, because the
ethnic groups were not recognized as statutory bodies with a right of representation. Only
individuals could use national rights, but they had big difficulties realizing this in public
life. Additionally, the equality of all national languages guaranteed in the second
paragraph, was immediately and indirectly invalidated in the next paragraph, since if not
every child in mixed regions was required to learn two languages, there could be no real
equality of all languages. Germans were neither required nor, in general, willing to learn
the language of a smaller Slavic nation. The non-German people, on the other hand, had
no chance to succeed in public life unless they learned and spoke German. Thus this
article helped to enhance the German position.
German haughtiness brought Germans into a difficult position at the end of
nineteenth century. For a long time, they were refusing to learn the Czech language;
whereas, the Czechs leant German as a necessary condition for their career, although it
was not a state language in an official sense. In 1897, the Count Badeni's government
issued a decree concerning the use of languages in the German-Czech territories.




writing in both languages. This undoubtedly just and fair decree, in the eyes of the
Czechs, created indignation among Germans.
C. BEGINNING OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY UNTIL 1939
A nation-state principle prevailed in Europe at the beginning of the twentieth
century even though a homogenous population state was still a rarity, especially in
Eastern and Central Europe.
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There were voices that were not openly against the
monarchy and supported its breakdown on the Czech-Austrian political scene, but there
were voices which called for full Czech autonomy or independence. "It is not true that
most Czechs were anti-Habsburg before the war or that they were all loyally Austrian
until the outbreak of war."
69 Czech lands sent their representatives to the Austria-
Hungary parliament in Vienna. The two conservative parties, Agrarians and Social
Democrats, represented the majority of Czechs and did not oppose the existence of the
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monarchy before the war; nonetheless, they were an opposition for the government. On
the other hand, parties supported by the urban, middle, and lower middle class, such as
the Young Czechs, the Progressives, and the National Socialists, supported the anti-
German ideas and the idea of splitting the Austria-Hungary Empire, and made plans or
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acted against the monarchy, but only the Progressives openly took a stand against the
Austria-Hungary Empire before the war.
1. Independence of Czechoslovakia in 1918 and Further Development
Until the Beginning of 1930s
Before World War I, Germany became the most important business partner for
Austria-Hungary. About 40 percent of Austrian import came from Germany and about
the same amount was exported to Germany. World War I resulted in a political and
economical dependence of the Austria-Hungary Empire on Germany. The result of it was
a plan for creating a custom union between Germany and Austria-Hungary, the so-called
Mitteleuropa.
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In the fall 1918, Germany, together with its main ally Austria-Hungary,
was defeated which contributed to the creation of new states, which emerged from
Austria-Hungary (figure H-2).
Figure II-2: A Map of Europe after the Dissolution of the Habsburg Empire in 1918
Source: Zeman, Zbynek, A. B., The break-up of the Habsburg empire 1914-1918, A study in national and
social revolution. New York, Octopus Books, 1977.
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The revolutionary atmosphere during the war indicated that a radical solution of
the national question in Austria-Hungary would be applied after the end of a war, but, in
its place, a new national program, made by Otto Bauer, was a step backward. The
program to transform the monarchy into a federation accepted the right of Roman and
Slavic nations for self-determination, but only within the monarchy, which would mean
Czechs would have the same unequal status as during the Austria-Hungary Empire.
Gradually at the end of the war, the dissolution of the Austria-Habsburg Empire was
becoming a reality. Consequently, Social Democrats and also German nationalists were
becoming followers of the right of nations for self-determination. They accepted this
right for other nations and their right to create their own states, but they also wanted to
stay as part of German-Austria and not to become a minority within a newly born state.
German-Moravian parliament members refused the association of German parts of
Moravia with Czechoslovakia and required an annexation of these parts to the German-
Austrian state. The Czech German National-Socialist Workers Party (Deutche
Nationalsozialistische Arbeiterpartei-DNSAP) even asked for direct unification of
Austria with Germany.
After issuing the emperor's manifest, German parliament members from Austria,
including members from the Czech region, met in Vienna on 21 October 1918 to claim
the establishment of a new state, German-Austria. They approved the resolution that read
the German nation had decided to establish an independent German-Austrian state, which
would settle relations with other nations by agreements. Additionally, they mentioned
that this new state required the entire area populated by Germans, especially Sudetenland.
Czechs refused the emperor's manifest, as well as establishment and claims of German-
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Austria. They stated that national issues and Czech question would not be solved within
the Austria-Hungary Empire but within the international context.
The first Czechoslovak Republic was established on 28 October 1918. The
Czechs identified fully with Czechoslovakia although it was a multiethnic state. They
considered it as a restoration of their statehood after three hundred years of Habsburg
rule. After the announcement that the Czechoslovak state was established, the German
Low Austria parliament members from the Czech territory met in Vienna on 29 October
asking for the right of nations for self-determination and announcing the separation of
northern parts of Bohemia from Czechoslovakia. They established an independent
province "Deutschbohmen" (German Bohemia) as a province of German-Austria.
According to this pattern, parliament members of northern Moravia and Silesia
announced the establishment of another German-Austria independent province
"Sudetenland" on October 30 in Vienna. The independent province "Deutschsudmahren"
(South German Moravia) made from the area within southern Moravia and
"Bbhmerwaldgau" (Bohemian Forest Region) from the Sumava region were created
during the following days.
7 Czech and German representatives met in Prague on 30
October 1918 and agreed on the questions of maintenance of "order and tranquillity" and
"Deutschbohmen" government but Czechs refused it.
Immediately after establishing the four independent provinces, German leaders
started to work on their organization. They created governments, issued new edicts and
orders, changed "unreliable" clerks, and occupied railway stations and important objects
by German so-called "national defense" (Volkswehr) units. The Czechoslovak
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government discussed the issue of German minorities and decided to negotiate with
Germans and include one German as minister-countryman into the final Czechoslovak
government. During its first meeting, Czechoslovak parliament decided to offer
cooperation to the Germans and promised all rights for free cultural and national
development, but German nationalist leaders refused all offers.
As a result of the war, there was a lack of food and also an insufficient supply
system in the Czechoslovak borderland. Therefore the waves of turmoil erupted in the
northern region at the beginning of November 1918. Germans called unsuccessfully for
help from Vienna, Dresden, and Berlin because Austria and Germany had to solve their
own problems. Finally, the "Deutschbohmen" government asked Prague for military
assistance. Prague sent troops there to settle disturbances.
During the second half of November 1918, the Czech government decided to start
a systematic military occupation of the frontier areas of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia.
The main reason was that Czechs wanted to prevent German residents of Czechoslovakia
from participating in the election for German-Austria National Rally in January 1919.
Also at that time, Czech-German industrialists in the borderland asked Germans to accept
the new Czechoslovak state. After several small range actions, the Czechoslovak
government decided to occupy the important northern Bohemian lignit coalfields. The
German "Volkswehr" units conducted small resistance in the city of Most. The
occupation of "Deutschbohmen" was finished by 16 December 1918 and at about the
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same time, Czechoslovak forces occupied "Deutschsudmahren." 73 Until the end of
December, all frontier lands were under Czechoslovak military control.
It was very important for Czechoslovakia to keep the borderland areas within the
existing historical and political framework of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia not only
because these areas had been there for whole centuries, but also because they were
significant parts of the territory, essential for the Czechoslovak state existence. They
represented the defense areas for saving and preserving the Czechoslovak state within its
present frontiers.
As a reaction to the Czechoslovak military occupation, the Germans sent a request
to Versailles and asked the Great Powers to send their troops to occupied
"Deutschbohmen" and other Czech German territories. The French and British
governments replied that German requirements could not be accepted, and until the Peace
Conference decided differently, the Czechoslovak state had to have its borders, which
had been approved by allied governments.
Within their effort for independence, the Germans in Sudeten lands were not
united and the disagreements deepened among different interest groups during the first
municipal elections. The Sudeten Germans had "no leaders and no popular movement of
real force that were justified in taking their stand upon the legal principle of self-
determination."
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Part of the Germans stated that the Czechoslovak government did not
have any rights to issue elections in German frontier lands and called for an election
3
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boycott; whereas, another part, especially German Social Democrats, supported
participation in elections. Thereafter, some other parties joined the German Social
Democrats and voted for participation. Finally, even the Czech-German government in
Sudeten lands expressed its opinion for participation in elections.
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Also the opinions about cooperation with Czechs and acceptance of the
Czechoslovak state were different. A number of the Sudeten Germans wanted to make an
immediate agreement with the Czechs, while others preferred independence for the
Germans and racially mixed areas with the intention of linking up later to Germany.
Another section was in a favor of joining Austria because they believed in the restoration
of the old empire in a new different form. Independence for Germans and racially mixed
areas was impossible because of the geographical situation of those areas (they did not
constitute one integral formation) and their economic non-viability as an independent
entity.
At the Peace Conference in Paris in 1918-1919, the Czechoslovak delegation
acted only as participant without any real decision-making power. Later, Czechoslovakia
was accused of submitting the memorandum which was full of hostility towards Germany
and the German race, giving incorrect data concerning the Germans in Czechoslovak
territory to mislead the Peace Conference, and promising its minorities a liberal internal
regime which it failed to keep. 76
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During the elections, the posters consisting of accusation and instigation against Czechs were also
distributed. The German nation was shown as a bearer of culture, and as the nation, which had been
determined to rule, and which was now humiliated.
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Czechoslovakia said that it openly and honestly stated that the statistics used in its
memoranda were approximate figures, based on the estimates of Czech factors and
together with this Czech data they cited the official Austrian statistics. Additionally, they
said that allied experts used the official Austro-Hungarian and German statistics relating
to the minority population. 77
At the opening of the Conference, the delegations of all the minor and new states
were asked to submit wishes and claims which the Czechoslovak delegation provided
within the prescribed time period. Each of the Great Powers (United States, Great Britain,
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France, Italy, and Japan) had its own experts who dealt with particular issues. The
important and leading point was Poland. A minority treaty with Poland was given as the
general basis of an obligation towards minorities and was adapted in details to the needs
of the other states. It was laid before the Czechoslovak delegation without any special
discussion. The Czechoslovak delegation accepted these principles at once and without
opposition. A Minority Protection Treaty, as a binding document, was signed by
Czechoslovakia representing one side, and USA, Britain, France, Italy, and Japan on the
other. Czechoslovakia also accepted the heaviness of a proportion of the old Austria-
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Hungarian debt, they agreed to pay the so-called liberation taxes.
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Propaganda launched in Germany claimed later that Czechoslovakia was not
following the treaties signed in Paris. According to the German Reich propaganda, the
Czechoslovakia promised German would be the second language in the country and
Czechoslovakia would follow the Switzerland model for settlement of the nationalities;
however, its government failed to fulfill its promises. Czechoslovakia defended its
position claiming the minority treaties were formulated in general terms and left to the
administration and bureaucracy to make their own free decisions in the matter of
minorities.
80 A higher number of German schools than Czech ones was one of the special
privileges, which Germans possessed in the pre-war era and which was changed.
Regarding the Czechoslovak Note and proposed privileges of the minorities within its
boundaries "it was observed that these facilities would be considerably more far-reaching
than any obligations which would be imposed upon Czechoslovakia by the Treaty." 81
Regarding territorial demands, the Czechoslovak delegation was the only one that
offered to a weakened Germany a portion of territory that had not previously belong to it.
Czechoslovakia demanded a small area in the district of Mucin where the majority of the
population was Czech and submitted a proposal for exchange of territory and rectification
of frontiers on both sides. It wanted to compensate Germany for this Hlucin district with
the territory that had for centuries belonged to the ancient Kingdom of Bohemia.
Germany published information about the Hlucin issue, but the number of documents,
diplomatic notes, and maps relating to this proposed exchange were not published.
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On 28 June 1919, the Versailles Peace Treaty was signed. Germany agreed to
accept the historical Bohemian borders and to establish regular diplomatic relations with
Czechoslovakia. The first Czechoslovak National Assembly was not created on a
proportional representational basis and Germans did not have their representatives there.
Universal suffrage with comparative representation, established in 1919, allowed
Germans to run the administration in cities where they had majority. Czechoslovak
Germans entered the Prague parliament after the first general elections in 1920. "The
Germans elected seventy-two deputies who represented 25.6 percent of the House of
Deputies."
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The German Nationalist deputies made use of the memoranda as early as 1920
and 1922 for criticism of Czechoslovak policy. A big conflict also occurred in May 1920
in the Prague parliament where the Language Law was discussed. The question was how
to formulate this law and avoid the well-known disaccord experience of the theory and
practice of the state language from the former Habsburg Empire. 83
Language law determined that in cities where the minority held more than two
thirds of inhabitants, the minority language was used for all oral or written proceedings.
In places where the minority consisted of more than twenty percent, the proceedings were
provided in both languages. For example in 1937, there was one German school per every
852 inhabitants, which was higher number than in Prussia at that time. Ninety-seven
percent of German children attended German schools supervised by German school
boards. According to the census in 1930, 2,338,000 Germans lived in regions where
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German was the official language. 84 Additionally since 1926, Germans had been
represented in all Czechoslovak governments and had the possibility to influence its
policy and decision-making process. 85
In April 1920, the so-called Political Leadership of German Sudeten People was
not successful with requesting financial help from the German government. Only some
German political parties were willing to provide support for the Sudeten Germans, such
as the German National People Party, which cooperated with its counterpart Czech-
German National Party (Deutschenationale Partei - DNP), and Hitler's National Socialist
German Workers Party (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei - NSDAP) which
created close cooperation with leaders of the Czech DNSAP. In the 1930s, they called for
the creation of the Third Reich, which would solve the German-Czech question.
The date, 16 October 1925 was an important landmark in international relations
because Western Allies signed an agreement with Germany, which guaranteeing
inviolable western borders. However this agreement did not mention anything about
eastern borders. Germany behaved as an equal partner of France and Britain in Locarno
and refused to guarantee the eastern borders designed by the Versailles Peace Treaty,
especially borders with Czechoslovakia and Poland.
".
.
., Czechoslovakia was a democracy in which the cultural rights of the Germans
were largely respected and their political wishes could receive public expression as long
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as they were not clearly treasonous."
86 The German situation in Czechoslovakia was
better than elsewhere in Europe, but during the economic crisis it became worse for
Germans workers because of objective reasons too; for example, light industry, which
was afflicted the most, was concentrated mostly in border regions and was dependent on
export. German nationalists misused this situation. The conclusion based on German
criticism was that as long as Czechoslovakia did not alter the spirit and lines of its policy
and failed to come to terms with its German minority there would not be good relations
between Germany and the Czechoslovak Republic.
2. Czech-German Relations During 1930s, Munich Agreement in 1938
and Occupation in 1939
In 1928, Nazis in Germany polled some 810,000 votes equaling 2.6 percent of
those cast. The economic crises helped them to spread their idea, to attract a lot of
unemployed people, and to make Hitler a German national figure. The following two
elections in 1930 and 1932 demonstrated that the Nazis had emerged as the country's
largest political party, but they were also a violent party.
There were about 3,200,000 Austria-Germans living in Czechoslovakia. They
became targets of German Nazi propaganda, because they were supposed to support the
expansionist plan of the Nazis. On 31 March 1931, German President Hindenburg stated
that Czechs had re-founded an ancient nation and established a strong state based on the
foundation of social democracy and anti-communism, but if Germany and Austria were
reunited, Czechoslovakia would be very endangered.
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Nazi's propaganda was decisively enhanced once Adolph Hitler had become
German chancellor and the NSDAP started to rule Germany. Nazi propaganda
continually increased in intensity and the Nazis claimed that they had to defend other
Germans who had to live abroad. Czechoslovakia had emerged from Versailles with
Germans living within its border who had always lived there as inhabitants of the
Habsburg and then the Austria-Hungarian Empire. Neither they nor their ancestors had
ever been citizens of the Reich. Nevertheless, Hitler's statements were very well accepted
by pseudo-Nazi parties in the Sudetenland, such as the Sedetendeutche Heimatfront
(Sudeten German Home Front). One of the Heimatfront 's most effective actions was to
send gangs into Czech communities to create border incidents. The Czechs had been
extraordinary tolerant to these incidents created by the Nazis living within the
Czechoslovak territory. Additionally, Czechs received "the word of honor" from Goring87
that the Czechs had nothing to fear from the Reich.
At the beginning of October 1933, the Czech National Socialist Party dissolved.
At that time, Konrad Henlein became a main Czech German leader and started to
organize a new Sudeten movement. In the same month, he created a new political party
"Sudetendeutsche Heimatsfront" (SHF), afterwards renamed the "Sudetendeutsche
Partei" (Sudeten German Party - SdP). From the beginning of 1935, this party received
support of fifteen thousands marks a month from Germany. On 19 May 1935, the SdP
had shown astonishing strength at the polls, winning 1,250,000 votes with three out of
every five Germans votes cast. It became the largest party in the Czech national
parliament; however, "[i]t was neither asked to form a government nor to take part in
87 He was Reichsmarshal and second person, after Hitler, within German NSDAP.
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one." To form a government would be impossible for SdP but the fact that it was not
member of a government was highly criticized.
In 1936, the Czechs started rapid rearming and building of a powerful line of
fortifications, similar to the French Maginot Line, along the German frontiers. Goebbels,
German Propaganda Minister, accused them of letting the Russians build military
airfields on their soil. The Sudeten Mountains, which Czechs had fortified to repel a
German attack, were an integral part of the region inhabited by Henlein's supporters. If
Hitler annexed them, those strongholds would become part of the Reich and the rest of
Czechoslovakia would be defenseless.
Until 1938, most Sudeteners had intermarried with Czechs or members of other
ethnic groups in Czechoslovakia. German propaganda created an impression that
everyone living in the Sudetenland was German and that Henlein was their spokesman.
Neither one was true. Henlein could not speak for all Germans. There were four other
political parties which strongly opposed Sudeten-German Nazis and at least a quarter
million of voters were German refugees from the Third Reich.
About ninety percent of Germans gave their vote for the Sudeten German Party in
municipal elections in 1938. They freely and democratically voted for Nazism. On the
other hand, it should not be overlooked that German democrats, despite the difficult
conditions and persecutions, defended Czechoslovakia.
After the Annexation of Austria on 12 March 1938, Hitler indicated he was in no
hurry to solve the Czech question. Additionally, he assured that he did not want Czechs
in the Reich and he would have been satisfied if the Sudeten Germans had been included
Grant Duff, Shiela, German and Czech, (London: V. Gollancz, 1937 ), p.47.
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in Germany. With the help of the national minority in Czechoslovakia, who was not
satisfied, Hitler wanted to get another area, which he could claim belonged to Germany.
In 1935, he started to instruct Konrad Henlein and pushed him to ask the Czech
government for other demands that it could not accept. In 1941, Henlein stated in
Vienna that he could now openly admit he had established a Nazi party with an
agreement of Berlin in 1933-34 to destroy Czechoslovakia. 90
In April 1938, Sudeten Germans asked for eight demands within the "Karlsbad
Program", including autonomy and the possibility to propagate German Weltanschauung,
meaning the Czechoslovak government should allow Nazi propaganda.91 Another
demand was that police, railway, and postal workers in the Sudetenland would be
required to speak German, and the Sudeten Germans would be entitled to their own town
and country government, allowing the Czechs troops to man the frontier fortresses with
unhindered access thereto. The demands were constructed in a way that they were
unacceptable for the Czech government. President Benes planned to open "serious
negotiation" with Henlein and to pass necessary legislation through the Czech legislature;
however, after Henlein issued his demands, he canceled this idea.
In May 1938, information was published stating German troops were
concentrated on the Czech frontier. 92 Gangs of Sudeten German youths wearing swastika
had attacked neighbors of Slavic descent, marched through streets, held rallies, and
on
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shouted "Heim ins Reich" (we want to go home to the Reich!). President Benes approved
an urgent recommendation of the Czechoslovak General Staff, calling up reservists and
specialist troops to man Sudetenland garrisons, therefore the Czechoslovak government
issued partial mobilization, but was forced by Western Powers to discontinue its effort.
At the beginning of September 1938, President Benes told representatives of the
Sudeten German Party that he promised to fulfil all their suggested requirements. He
immediately signed all requests. Karl Hermann Frank93 said about it: "My God, they gave
us everything!"
94 Confused leadership of the Sudeten German Party gave the order to
create incidents, so it had some reason not to accept Benes's offer.
Henlein militants started an attempt of a coup in September 1938, but they were
quickly defeated and escaped into Germany. They started to organize "Sudetendeutsche
Freikorps" which was tasked to make attacks against Czechoslovak border guards and
guardrooms and undergo other terrorist actions. They killed at least 110 Czech
inhabitants and more than 2,000 were dragged away into Germany. Additionally, an open
attack started after 20 September 1938, when two SS battalions95 occupied As salient.96
Western powers wanted to avoid war, so they agreed to make a concession and
accept Hitler's demand to unite all Germans in one state and annex Sudetenland to the
Reich. A final Munich document was signed early on 29 September 1938 and specified
that Czechoslovakia would begin evacuation of the Sudetenland immediately. All Czechs
13 A significant figure within the Sudeten German Party; he later became Deputy of Reinhard Heydrich,
Deputy Reichsprotektor in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.
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in the Sudetenland had to be gone by 10 October. Anyone who remained would be
arrested or shot as trespassers, because the region would be Reich soil. During the
evacuation, German troops would be moving in to protect the area and to restore order.
The entire procedure would be supervised by an international commission, which would
also decide when plebiscite should be held. The Munich agreement ended the existence
of the first Czechoslovak Republic after twenty years as a successful democracy.
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Figure II-3: A Map of German Areas of Settlement within Bohemia and Moravia-
Silesia.
Source: Luza, Radomir, The Transfer of the Sudeten German: A Study of Czech-German Relations, 1933-
1962, New York, New York University Press, 1964.
Germans lived in Czechoslovakia in eight different areas (Figure II-3) hampering
the creation of a united state. This was realized in 1918 when Germans had to create
several independent areas, and also after Munich, when regions designated by this treaty
consisting of 28,971 square kilometers with 3,636,000 inhabitants were reduced in March
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1939 to an area called "Sudetenland" containing 22,608 square kilometers with 2,943,187
inhabitants.
The Munich agreement meant that not only Germans, but also 739,000 Czechs
were annexed to the German Reich (viz. Figure II-4). For instance, in Southern Moravia,
the cities with an overwhelming Czech majority were occupied by Germans. 97 Czech
inhabitants were forced to leave their homes and German families started to move into
the newly established "Sudetenland" where they could acquire land. After the Munich
agreement, about 120,000 Czechs, allowed to take only several pieces of luggage, were
expelled from the borderland to inland. During the period after Munich, Germans
distributed about 150,000 hectares of land to Sudeten German Party leaders, abolished
Czech schools only with few exceptions, confiscated or bought for very cheap price,
Czech factories, and confiscated Czech banks. Additionally, Czechs were not allowed to
participate in municipal administration, and their associations were disbanded and their
property confiscated.
At the end of February 1939, Slovakia discussed conditions with Germany about
the future Slovak state. In the meantime, Germany issued propaganda about new
oppression of the remaining Germans in the rest of Bohemian lands. All of this
contributed to a final attack against Czechoslovakia. On 15 March 1939, German forces
entered the independent part of Czechoslovakia, and Slovaks declared the independent
Slovak state. Czech lands were declared as the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. In
fall 1939, the Czech universities were closed, high representatives of university students
were executed and many students were dragged away into concentration camps.
7
The number in parenthesis shows the percentage of Czech inhabitants in a city. For example, Znojmo
(64.29), Breclav (83.4), Stramberk (98.62), Policka (96.84), Hlucin (89.18), Koprivnice (86.3), and others.
52
GERMANY territory ceded ro the ReicH
territory ceded to Hungory
territory ceded to Polond
POLAND
HUNGARY RUMANIA
Figure II-4: A Map of the Czechoslovak Territory Ceded after the Munich
Agreement in 1938
Source: Luza, Radomir, The Transfer of the Sudeten German: A Study of Czech-German Relations, 1933-
1962, New York, New York University Press, 1964.
D. WORLD WAR II AND POST-WORLD WAR II DEVELOPMENT
1. World War U and 1945-48 Period
After the German invasion of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, the Czech-German
democratic parties disappeared, since their leader either "were made silent" or were
exiled. President Benes believed that all democratic forces would be united for the fight
against Nazism. In his speech in Chicago in June 1939, he addressed even Sudeten
Germans. "Unite in the fight for freedom of our nation and state. Unite all free Czechs,
Slovaks, Karpatian Rutherians, and also all free Sudeten Germans who report to us from
whole world and from our state. „98
There were two opinions on the German question from the German anti-Nazi side
during the war. The first was represented by Mr. Jaksch, German Socialist anti-Nazi with
98 Smutny, Jaromfr, Svedectvipresidentova kanclere, (Prague: Mladd fronta, 1996), p.277.
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strong nationalist feeling. He stressed the right of a nation of self-determination, which
wants to stay as an independent region within Czechoslovakia, or which wants to be a
province of the Reich. The second was represented by Mr. Bauer, a communist
parliament member, who said that Germans still considered themselves as citizens of
Czechoslovakia.
On 10 March 1940, the Sudeten German Socialists in exile in Britain defined their
aims publicly but more cautiously. They claimed that they would be members of the
European Federation together with Czechs, but as a fully recognized nationality with
their own regional parliament and government. This was in contradiction with the Czech
conception of continuity in their pre-Munich state. In London, German Socialist leader,
Mr. Jaksh, openly denied this continuity."
Himmler's 100 task was to Germanize, which should have affected the Czechs more
then the Poles, because fifty percent of the Czechs were marked down for Germanization.
The Czechs had not been subjected to the shattering military defeat and their traditional
resistance to Germanization was more passive than that of the Poles. "It was difficult,
even with the help of concentration camps, to Germanize a people which was self-trained
to pretend to be stupid to understand German." 1 * During the period after the
assassination of Heydrich 102 Nazi terror significantly increased. The total destruction of
)9
Wiskermann, Elizabeth, Germany's Eastern Neighbours, (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), p.64.
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Reinhard Heydrich was Reich Protector in the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia during World War II
until his death in June 1 94 1
.
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the villages, Lidice and Lezaky, by Nazis resulted in higher negative feeling towards
Germans, whether they came from Bohemia or elsewhere.
In London, President Benes discussed with Germans in exile the possible future
of Germans in Czechoslovakia. In 1942, he told them he had thought about the transfer of
some Germans into Germany but not all Germans, "I have never wished orderly Germans
who fought with us for democracy and stayed loyal to democracy to be forced into a
tragic situation."
103 He determined principles for the transfer. So, according to him, about
800,000 or 1,000,000 Germans could stay in Czechoslovakia if German representatives
would cooperate. In this case, there could be some arguments why Germans could stay in
such a huge amount. The problem was that Germans in exile did not have any leader who
would negotiate and lessen the range of transfer. Therefore the transfer of Germans was
carried out in a larger amount than Benes and the exile London government had
considered.
On 5 August 1942, the British parliament annulled the Munich agreement. At that
time, British Minister Nichols, appointed to the Czechoslovak exile government in
London, informed "... at the time of the final solution of our minority problems after the
victorious end of the war the British government did not intend to oppose the principle of
transfer of the minority population from Czechoslovakia in an endeavor to make
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During May and June 1945, executions were made, especially members of the SS,
military Wehrmacht, and traitors, but these executions generally were not preceded by
any investigation. In June 1945, many Czechs returned home from concentration camps
and were put into a position of authority, which they used sometimes with hatred for
everything German. 105
Choosing the Henlein party and shouting "Heim ins Reich", Germans clearly
showed that most of them did not care about either democracy nor freedom and Nazism,
as a state system, was fully acceptable to them.
106
Transfer, therefore, was seen as a
prevention of repeating that situation from 1938. Benes figured that the transfer would
take five years including a two year period for the transfer of the main number of
Germans, but six years of occupation led to many cases of personal revenge, very often
on innocent Germans, and to demands to transfer Germans as quickly as possible.
Additionally, the rush was the reason for some flaws during the transfer; for example,
lists of abandoned property were not made, confirmations of abandoned property were
not provided, the idea of President Benes paying compensation for abandoned property to
people not actively participating in anti-state activities was not executed. The entire
transfer was supervised by international observers who issued information that news in
the German mass media was overstated. Later, opinions were that if a communist coup
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On 19 May 1945, President Benes issued the first of several decrees, which were
related to the Czech-German question. It was decree 5/1945 Sb. about the invalidity of
legal property issues from the occupation period and about the national administration of
the property of Germans, Hungarians, traitors, and collaborators. In article 2, it was
mentioned that property of unreliable people in the Czechoslovak state should be put
under state administration. Another decree 12/1945 Sb. addressed the confiscation and
rapid distribution of agricultural property belonging to Germans, Hungarians, traitors,
and collaborators. For example; in article 1 paragraph 1, the decree stated the agricultural
property of all Germans should be confiscated regardless of their citizenship. In August,
decree 33/1945 Sb. was issued, questioning citizenship for persons of German or
Hungarian nationality. 107 According to this decree, all Germans or Hungarians lost their
Czechoslovak citizenship, except in those cases when they stated in some official paper
that they had been Czechs or Slovaks from 21 May 1938 until a given day. The next
decree, 16/1945 Sb., discussed punishment of Nazi criminals, traitors, and collaborators,
and extraordinary people's courts. On 28 March 1946, the Czechoslovak parliament
passed constitutional law, No. 57/1946, that approved all President Benes' decrees and
stated that these decrees would become a law.
After World War II, the German parliament members turned to France and Great
Britain, powers contributing to the Munich agreement in 1938, and asked them to give a
just solution for Sudeten German problems as their moral responsibility. These two
countries, together with the Soviet Union and the USA, solved this problem by the
Potsdam Agreement. The transfer of Germans from Czechoslovakia, Poland, and
107
Decree No. 5/1945, 12/1945, 33/1945. Available [Online]: < http://www.psp.cz/cgi-
bin/ascii/docs/laws/dek/>, Internet Explorer, [4 November 1999].
57
Hungary was contained in article 13 of this declaration from 2 August 1945. The Control
body agreed with the suggestion of the Czechoslovak government and decided that
1,750,000 Germans would be send into the American zone and 750,000 Germans into the
Soviet zone.
108
Germans refused the idea that the transfer was not intended as punishment or
revenge. They said that the punishment of offenders should have been a matter of the
Czechoslovak courts and it did not matter if an offender was Czech, Slovak, or German.
According to Germans, the transfer was intended as a political action of a wide range.
Actually, it was a preventive measure with the purpose of preventing a repeat of a similar
situation in 1938.
In October 1945, the Czech Minister of Interior announced the approval of the
transfer of two and half million Germans. The Czechoslovak government prepared a
directive for the transfer according to which Reception Centers were created. Each of
them would accommodate 1,200 persons. Reception Centers were created in places
where Germans, scheduled for transfer, were concentrated. The assumption was that
Germans would spend only one or two weeks there, but it was impossible to follow these
plans for two reasons. First, in Czechoslovakia, there was a big number of Germans who
were not supposed to receive any legal punishment, or be scheduled for long-term work,
but had lost their homes and did not have any place to go. All of them lived or were put
in so-called "Mixed" Reception Centers where people determined for transfer were
together with people who could stay in Czechoslovakia but had to conduct hard labor.
There were 75 of these centers in Bohemia, 29 in Moravia, and 3 in Slovakia. A special
08
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department of the Ministry of Interior provided administration and supervision over the
centers.
Second, in January 1946, a directive from the Ministry of Interior specified in
President Benes's decree 16/1945 Sb. that only members of specific German organization
should be punished. It resulted in a new wave of people put into Reception Centers.
Additionally, some of the Germans spent a longer time in these Centers because the
Ministry of Interior asked for an inquiry with these people for information on traitors and
collaborators. For these reasons, the situation in Reception and Mixed Reception Centers
became worse. The Ministry of Interior partially wanted to solve this problem by
removing persons, who were judged guilty, out of the Receptions Centers and put them
into jail.
109
The Reception Centers had strict order and breaking of this order by guardians
was to be severely punished; however, this order was not followed every time. Faults
were discovered in Reception Centers, such as bad accommodations, lack of
accommodation equipment, and overcrowded conditions. 110
Negotiations with Americans were held in January 1946 and technical conditions
were agreed upon. On 25 January 1946, the first transport left Czechoslovakia. Each
German person had a right to take clothes, shoes, coat, 500 Reich marks, and 50 kilos of
luggage into the Soviet zone or 75 kilos of luggage into the American zone. Continued
transfer into the American zone started on January 24, 1946. Overcrowding of the
American zone resulted in a decreasing number of transports per day and consequently
109
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the transfer was temporarily stopped on 30 November 1946. Transfer into the Soviet zone
started on 10 June 1946 and finished on 18 October 1946. Until June 30, 1947, there were
1,223,000 Germans officially transferred into the American zone along with 250,000
Germans who chose to go there individually. A total of 636,000 Germans were officially
transferred into the Soviet zone and 150,000 Germans chose to go there individually.
Finally, about 270,000 Germans were left in Czechoslovakia. 111
The German people were put into these centers because of denunciations, illegal
accusations, or hard labor punishment. They had to undergo bad conditions in the camps
where punishing of prisoners physically was prohibited, but according to mindful of that
this law was followed only a little. 112 It depended on how strong personality the
commander of the camp and guardians were.
On 23 January 1947, a directive of the Ministry of Interior again described the
categories of people to be transferred. At the end of 1947, the American side did not want
to renew mass transfers and about 190,000 Germans remained in Czechoslovakia. During
1947, the discrimination measures were gradually abandoned. The International Red
Cross committees executed inspections of the Reception Centers and discovered
violations; such as insufficient food, and quickly consigned children who were not
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2. Communist Regime in Czechoslovakia and Its Relation with Germany
During 1948-89
In February 1948, government members of three Czechoslovak parties, the
National Socialist Party, Slovak Democratic Party, and the People's Party resigned. They
wanted to create a government crisis and early elections. But there was no cooperation
among all opposition parties, so Social Democrats did not join the effort of the above
mentioned parties. The Communists used this situation for their coup and created their
communist government. 114
During that period, when Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSSR) was under the
communist regime, the question of mutual relations regarding the Sudeten German issue
was not openly mentioned in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. After the end of
World War n, relations between Czechoslovakia and Germany were very tense. The
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was considered as ideological enemy, which wanted
to undermine "communist democracy" in Czechoslovakia, and the transfer of Sudeten
Germans was thought as a right thing.
Relations with "East Germany", the German Democratic Republic (GDR), were
totally different. In 1950, Czechoslovakia and GDR signed a declaration that both
countries did not have any territorial or border requirements with each other, and that the
transfer of Germans was unchangeable, just, and definitively solved. 115 FRG refused to
recognize GDR as an independent state. Its response was that communists in GDR were
only the minority, and the FRG was the only legal successor state of Germany.
114




Czechoslovakia belonged to the main trade partners, together with the Soviet
Union and FRG. When the oil prices increased and the Soviet Union cut down its oil
export, GDR increased cooperation with Czechoslovakia in the chemical industry. 116
Both countries also cooperated militarily within the Warsaw Pact. However, in 1968
afraid that the ideas of the Prague Spring could threaten social and political order in
GDR, "...the SED 117 leadership allowed GDR troops to participate in the Warsaw Pact's
suppression of the Czech reform movement...." 118
During the 1950s and 1960s, leaders of the former Czech-Germans criticized
Czechoslovakia for its communist regime and for communist rule in Central and Eastern
Europe. They stated that it is only German credit that saved Europe before communism.
But actually, it was the fault of the Sudeten Germans who had contributed to the
beginning of war, allowing Stalin and communism to enter Berlin, Prague, and Warsaw.
During the 1950s, the Germans expressed their opinions about where they should




refused Czechoslovakism - state and principles on which it is based
2) return to the situation before Munich, but under totally different conditions for
Germans who lived in Czechoslovakia before the transfer, namely:
a) the establishing of an autonomous territory Sudetenland
b) the right of self-determination for this territory
116
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c) a change in the state order in Czechoslovak Republic and entire Central
Europe.
119
In the beginning of 1960s, German political parties made statements about the
German expellees' issue. They recognized Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft as an
organization representing expelled Sudeten Germans. They stated that the Sudeten
German issue was not solved and that Sudeten Germans had the right for self-
determination and for a fatherland.
The Czechoslovak Communist regime criticized Germany for Germans calling for
a right of nations for self-determination, but not having anything common with a fight of
nation for freedom and self-determination. Communists said that the former Sudeten
Germans misused the idea of self-determination for deceiving the masses and used them
for their reactionary imperialistic and militant goals.
The mutual relations between CSSR and FRG were without any change until the
late 1960s when the German Social Democratic government of Willy Brandt ended the
confrontational policy toward the Central and Eastern European Communist countries.
First, FRG and GDR negotiated mutual relations in 1972, and then they signed the Basic
Treaty on 8 November 1972. They agreed to develop their relations, to solve possible
disagreements by peaceful means, to agree with present borders as inviolable, and not
interfere in the affairs of the other state. The FRG abandoned its position towards GDR,
except it did not explicitly recognize the other state, and the GDR gave up its insistence
to be explicitly recognized as a foreign country. Then in 1973, CSSR and FRG signed the
Treaty on Mutual Relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the
119
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Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. Czechoslovakia and Federal Republic of Germany
(FRG), stated that it was necessary for peace to create harmonious coexistence of the
nation in Europe. German Chancellor Willy Brandt and Prime Minister of the CSSR,
Lubomir Strugal, together with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of both states, signed the
Treaty on Mutual Relations between the FRG and the CSSR.
Articles I and IV were very important for both countries. In Article I, both
countries expressed that they treat the Munich agreement invalid. Article IV, paragraph 1
said "... the Federal Republic of Germany and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
reaffirm the inviolability of their common frontier now and in the future and undertake to
120
respect each other's territorial integrity without restriction."
CSSR and FRG agreed that they would establish diplomatic relations, open
embassies in Prague and Bonn, and would nominate representatives with the rank of
Ambassador. They also approved that they would make an extension of their economic,
scientific, technological, cultural, environmental, and other relations, and mutual
interests. The cooperation between these two countries started to develop.
120
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HI. FALL OF COMMUNISM AND THE JOURNEY TOWARD DEMOCRACY
The year 1989 changed the political situation in Czechoslovakia, ended the
communist regime and started to build up democracy. This change of system resulted in
further changes in foreign policy towards Western countries, especially towards Germany
where the process of unification of Germany played an important role. This chapter will
describe the development in Czechoslovakia after the 1989 revolution, and later in the
Czech Republic after the split of the Republic in 1993. The chapter is divided into two
parts; the first part will discuss development in Czechoslovakia from 1989 to the split of
the country and creation of the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic (Slovakia) on
1 January 1993. The second part will provide information about the situation in Czech-
German relations, discuss the process of the creation and the development of the Czech-
German declaration in 1995-97, and describe attitudes of both countries towards mutual
relations after the signing of the declaration.
A. RELATIONS BETWEEN GERMANY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA
DURING 1989 - 1992 PERIOD
The first Czechoslovak Republic in 1918-39 was considered as a Czech
democratic tradition, which helped to shape the November 1989 revolution. Czechs were
able to preserve their belief in democracy as a characteristic of their nation without any
problems, because the collapses of the democratic regime were seen as catastrophes
65
imposed on them by others from outside: by the Nazis in 1939 and by a Moscow led coup
d'etat in 1948.
121
The Czechoslovak hard-line communist regime did not give any space for
reformists within the Communist Party. 122 Therefore the rigid system was not able to
react to the new situation, which developed after the students' anti-regime demonstration
on 17 November 1989 during which students were beaten. This beating led to a general
strike. The hard-line communist leader, Miroslav Stepan, appealed to members of the
People's Militia and other armed units to deal with anti-socialist elements. But militia
units disbanded themselves and General Vaclavik, Minister of Defense, gave a speech on
television and said that the Armed Forces would not fight the people. 123 Communist
leaders were not flexible and open to democratic ideas and negotiations, like, for
example, communists in Bulgaria were, 124 and the regime just collapsed and communists
leaders left their positions. Two days after the strike, the Federal Assembly abolished an
article in Czechoslovak constitution about the leading role of the Communist Party.
The Communists tried to stay in power and satisfy demonstrators by reforming
the government. The new cabinet consisted of fifteen communists and five non-
communists; however, after the new demonstrations occurred, new cabinet reform was
installed. The renewed government consisted of nine communists and eleven non-
121
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communists. On 28 December 1989, Mr. Alexander Dubcek was elected the Federal
Assembly chairman and Vaclav Havel was elected president one day later. 125
Great changes also occurred in Germany. After the fall of the Berlin Wall there
was an opportunity to reunify Germany. Chancellor Kohl decided to take the opportunity
and make it happen as fast as possible. The CDU won the elections in March 1990 in
West Germany, and in April 1990 the East Germany government, elected after the first
free elections in the German Democratic Republic, held earlier that year, approved the
idea to unite with West Germany. By the end of June 1990, the East German mark was
abolished and both countries coalesced economically. Negotiations between World War
II victorious power and Germany were held and finally "the 2+4 Treaty" was signed.
Prior to this, Mr. Kohl could overcome any resistance of Soviet president Mikhail
Gorbatchev, 126 and the unification occurred on 3 October 1990.
From 17 November 1989 to the end of the year, the beginning of a new
democratic era in Czechoslovak history took root. This so called "velvet revolution"
resulted in the end of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia and brought forward a
new approach toward Czech-German relations. From the Czech point of view, Germany
stopped being one of the western enemies and became a friendly neighbor and important
economic partner. The old views on the post-war transfer of Germans were replaced
because dissidents and exiles brought opinions and approaches to the Czechoslovak
political scene gained from western historians and political scientists' literature
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unobtainable or prohibited under the old communist regime. People in Czechoslovakia
were influenced by the communist regime propaganda and their sources of information
on Czech-German relations and German transfer were limited. Sources and literature
about the transfer were focused mainly on the Sudeten German role before World War II
and their contribution to Nazi Germany occupation of Czechoslovakia, the creation of the
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, and the suffering of the Czech nation during
World War n. The facts were not mentioned that some of the Sudeten Germans suffered
in Nazi concentration camps and that after World War II, Germans were killed and
thousands of them were forced to leave Czechoslovakia during the so-called "wild
transfer." There was also no description of German suffering in camps while waiting for
transportation to Germany during the transfer based on the Potsdam Agreement.
Therefore it was quite difficult for a new dissident's approach to Czech-German relations
to be heard and to get support from Czech public.
After the "velvet revolution", politicians formulated an opinion that if
Czechoslovakia wanted "to return to Europe" and to become one of the full democratic
states again, it had to settle its relations with other nations, especially with Germans. It
was stressed that resolving the Sudeten German issue was one of the most important
concerns because without settling this relationship with the closest western neighbor,
Czechoslovakia could not be included in democratic Europe. "The national traditions
were invoked to foster the confidence that the Czechs, as a democratic, cultural, and well-
educated nation rightfully belonged to the West." 12 The idea of the return to Europe
became a major issue during the 1990 election campaign and also during the following
127




128 The economic reform, abandonment of the central planning system and building
of a market economy were also some of the elements of this return. The support of good
Czech-German relations was expressed in several ways: by showing and stressing periods
of mutual cooperation of these two nations, criticizing significant historical Czechoslovak
persons, such as Palacky or Masaryk, describing the suffering under Nazi rule of some
Sudeten Germans who for the most part were peaceful and did not want to disrupt
Czechoslovakia. A new approach and newly issued literature 129 showed all sides of the
transfer and pointed out that unlawful transfer of Germans was connected to the rise of
the Communist party power in post-war Czechoslovakia.
Vaclav Havel demonstrated his desire to reconstruct good relations with Germany
and immediately after becoming the Czechoslovak president, he visited both the Federal
Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. He also gave an important
speech on 15 March 1990 when Richard von Weizsacker, president of the Federal
Republic of Germany, visited Czechoslovakia. Havel said that the German president had
already spoken many hard truths about the suffering that German ancestors caused
Czechs, and then he expressed the opinion that Czechs had not said everything they
should have said about their guilt. President Havel apologized for atrocities committed by
Czechs during the transfer of the German population and Havel admitted that Czechs had
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Instead of giving a proper trial to all those who betrayed their state we
drove them out of the country and punished them with the punishment
which was unknown to our legal system. It was not punishment it was
revenge. Moreover, we did not expel them on the basis of proved
individual guilt, but simply because they were members of a certain
nation. And thus, on assumption that we were clearing the way for
historical justice we hurt many innocent people most of all women and
children.
130
V&clav Havel stated he hoped that very soon the bold line after World War II would be
drawn, followed by Europe establishing a friendly union of free nations and democratic
states, founded on common respect for all human rights.
This speech by President Havel was highly condemned by the Czechoslovak
public. Most Czechs saw this as his biggest political blunder affecting the president's
popularity for a number of reasons. First, people were excluded from knowing all facts,
so they did not see and feel any reason to apologize to Germans. Additionally, they
considered Germans as a guilty nation, which should apologize to Czechs; then they saw
the transfer as a way in which to prevent another Munich Agreement and as a logical
result of the World War n. Next, many people also thought, and still think, and feared
that an apology and confirmation of a lawless transfer to Germany and Sudeten Germans
could open up an opportunity for Germans to return to the Czech borderland and that
Czech people could lose their property obtained during the late 1940s and 1950s
resettlement of the borderland areas.
President Havel's speech was continuously criticized during the following years.
For example in 1994, Mr. Hekrdla criticized Havel's apology for the growing number of
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property requests from the German side. He said that the best way to defend Czech
interests was to make Czech policy stronger; otherwise, Czechs could fall under the
intensified German demands like during the Henlein period in 1937-38. 131
Contrarily, President Havel also had his supporters. Mr. Zak responded to Mr.
Hekrdla in Pravo and said that he understood Havel's gesture as an expression of
Czechoslovak political maturity. He also stated that there were many organizations
among the Sudeten Germans that did not look for revenge and demonstrate an ordinary
partner relationship could exist between Czechs and Sudeten Germans. He mentioned, as
an example, a representative of the Catholic Ackermanngemeinde 132 who had reacted to
Havel's gesture and had apologized for the Sudeten German role in the disruption of
Czechoslovakia in 1938-1939. 133
The restitution law solved the people's fear of losing property. The date of 25
February 1948 was issued as the bottom line for available restitution. It meant if
someone's property was confiscated before this date, for example; according to President
Benes's decrees, he or she could not get confiscated property back. This date was chosen
because it was the date of a communist coup in Czechoslovakia and after that date,
confiscation and laws adopted by the communist regime were considered unlawful.
Czechoslovakia until the communist coup in 1948 was considered a democratic state; its
laws and property confiscation resulting from different decrees or laws issued by the
president or parliament were thought of as democratic and lawful.
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In these circumstances, the mayors of some towns where Sudeten Germans had
lived before the transfer, such as; As and Liberec, during the years 1991-93, received
many requests from Sudeten Germans for the property which had been confiscated
according to Benes's decrees after World War II. 134 The mayors used the restitution law, a
set date of 25 February 1948 for property claims, and the valid Benes's decrees to
respond to these claims.
In February 1992, the Agreement of Good Neighborhoods and Friendly
Cooperation between the Czechoslovak Federative Republic and the Federal Republic of
Germany was signed. The Agreement confirmed nullity of the Munich Agreement
already mentioned in the 1973 agreement. Both sides, Czechoslovakia and Germany,
mentioned they were aware of many innocent victims of war, violence, and expulsion.
They also expressed a firm decision not to use force and revenge for lawlessness to
commit new injustices. Both sides stated that they would support all activities
contributing to mutual understanding of Czechoslovak-German history and relations.
This agreement did not solve the Czech-Sudeten German issue or any possible
compensation claims for expulsion. Moreover, the problem was the 1992 agreement did
not get support from a substantial part of the Czechoslovak opposition and the Bavarian
CSU did not support it as well. 135
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B. DIVISION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, NEW ATTITUDE TOWARD THE
CZECH-GERMAN ISSUE AND THE CZECH-GERMAN
RECONCILIATION PROCESS
After the 1992 elections, the discussion about the future of the common state of
Czechs and Slovaks was developed. The federal system and inherited constitution, which
provided a small number of parliament members, if they were determined or absent, with
veto power within the Assembly, resulted in the division of Czechoslovakia. 136
Consequently, different Czech and Slovak opinions on reforms and state settlement and
the federal system could result in a situation that the Federal Assembly would not be able
to pass any proposed legislation or bill. The 1992 elections produced a Prime Minister of
the Czech Republic, Vaclav Klaus, and a Prime Minister of Slovakia, Vladimir Meciar,
with electoral pluralities, different economic and political agendas, and veto power over
each other.
137
Because of their different goals and mutual veto power, which could
disable the other party in taking some steps, the dissolution of state was a logical and
rational solution.
The Czech side was afraid that it was the last country, along with Slovakia, which
did not receive any compensation from Germany and that all Nazi victims would die
without receiving any financial compensation for their suffering. Therefore the Czech
government approved a law and created a fund, in the year of 1994, for the Czech victims
who obtained roughly the same amount of money as the Polish people did. 138 This
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solution was good for Czech victims of the Nazi regime, but, consequently, later it turned
up as an unfortunate step in connection with the Czech-German issue and the
compensation that the German side was expected to pay. The German side considered
compensation for Czech victims resolved. The German Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel,
answered the question as to whether the Fund for the Future, which should be one of the
results of the Czech-German declaration, would be used also for Czech victims; he
thought those people had already been compensated by the Czech side. 139
In 1994, the German chairperson of Bundestag, Mrs. Rita Sussmuth, offered to
negotiate with the Czech parliament chairman Mr. Uhde on a parliamentary level about
the compensation issue, including Sudeten German problems, which were not covered by
the 1992 agreement and left open. Mr.Uhde refused this offer because, according to him,
it was not appropriate for the Czech parliament to discuss such issues. 140 All German
parliamentary parties condemned this step, and they said that a democratic state should
openly discuss its problems, even if they were very difficult.
The economic cooperation between the Czech Republic and Germany further
developed for several years after the revolution in 1989, and Germany became a very
important business partner for the Czech Republic. It looked like the situation was stable
and there were almost no problems in Czech-German relations except that the Czech
Republic and Slovakia were still countries that had not receive direct compensation for
139
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Nazi victims due to the Sudeten German problem. In response, there was an endeavor
from the Czech side to solve the Sudeten German issue and to get some compensation
before all victims died and to make "a thick line after the past" 141 forever. This
contributed to initiating the process of the creation of the Czech-German declaration,
which could solve the entire issue. It is necessary to say that the idea of a declaration was
from former dissidents and exiles led by Vaclav Havel. The purpose was to settle the
issue and to make amends with history. The practical and pragmatic politicians did not
see any need for such declaration, particularly when they saw the Czech public did not
favor a Czech apology to Germans, or any kind of property return or compensation. For
example, in 1993, seventy-six percent of Czechs approved the 1945 transfer of the
Sudeten Germans and considered that issue closed. 142 They felt that opening up the
Sudeten German issue and all relating cases would worsen the present good relations
with Germany, especially in the economic sphere; they also feared that it could harm
their political carriers.
The turning point was the speech of President Havel at Charles University on 17
February 1995. He asked for further development of Czech-German relations in the
future. In his speech, Vaclav Havel stated that it was time to finish apologizing and
sending bills for the past lawlessness, and it was time to start matter-of-fact discussions.
He said "confrontation has to end definitively and cooperation has to start" 143 . He also
141
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mentioned that Germany had to say good bye to the idea of a nationalistic state superior
to others and that the Czech Republic had to abandon "provincional fear" of Germans and
forget the long-time fed prejudices about them. He stressed the Czech Republic would
not negotiate over World War n results, interference into its legal system, and any kind
of corrections of history to the detriment of contemporaries. He expressed a hope that
thoughts of the Czech-German past, present, and future and the Czech-German
reconciliation could be developed on the basis of mutual accord and the common fight
against all those who want to spread ideas of nationalism. He stated that it was necessary
• r- 144
to stop the course of revenge.
Reaction to the President's speech among Czech politicians throughout the entire
political spectrum was positive because Havel used the traditional Czech interpretation of
history and denied any revision of war results and Czech laws. Although he asked for
discussion, he did not leave much space for it. 145 If he said that the Czech Republic would
never negotiate about revisions of World War II results or changes in the Czech legal
system, then there was nothing to negotiate because admitting the lawlessness of the
transfer and rejection of Benes's decrees were and are two main Sudeten Germans'
demands. President Benes's decrees were not so legally clear or unambiguous that it had
to or should be defended. The Czech side should distant itself at least from the decrees,
which forgave crimes committed on German people during the immediate post-war
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Havel also talked about German inhabitants in Czechoslovakia who had preferred
dictatorship and violence to democracy and dialogue. 146 It is not appropriate to put all
Sudeten Germans into the same category because of their nationality. Germans got
caught by nice speeches from the Reich, just as Czechs got caught by communism ideas
after the World War II. Just as it can not be said that everyone who voted for the
Communist Party in 1946, voted for concentration camps and judicial murders, and as it
is impossible to say that all Sudeten Germans voted for Henlein. 147
Karl Heinz Filipp, professor at the University of Hamburg and honored member
of the teachers' staff at Pedagogical Faculty in Prague, was one of the critics of Havel's
speech in February 1995. He said that when President Havel stated he believed in a
democratic, liberal, and European Germany of Theodor Heuss, Konrad Adenauer, Kurt
Schumacher, Ludwig Erhard, Willi Brandt, and Richard von Weizsacker, he should also,
as a realistic politician, have said that he believed in a democratic Germany and Bavaria
of Theo Weigel and Edmund Stoiber. Professor Filipp commented if Havel expressed the
concept of leaving monologue and confrontation and starting dialogue why had he
avoided mentioning the Sudeten German issue. 148
In March 1995, the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic dealt with the
suggestion to abolish Benes's decree, No. 108/1946 Sb., concerning the confiscation of
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enemy property, and the creation of funds for national restoration. The Constitutional
Court decided that this decree was not only legal but also an legitimate act at the time it
was issued.
149
Therefore, the Constitutional Court refused the suggestion to abolish this
decree. The decision met with very negative reaction in the Federal Republic of
Germany. This was not a good way to create normal relations between the Czech
Republic and Germany. 150
The situation was not easy for either side, Czech or German, for the following
reasons. According to the decision of the German Constitutional Court, if the German
government accepted the invalidity of property claims by Sudeten Germans it would take
the commitments on itself and would have to pay compensation by itself. 151 The German
Constitutional Court rejected the Sudeten German complaint that the 1973 Czech-
German Agreement had touched their constitutional rights because confiscation of
property without compensation is unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court stated that
the Agreement did not consider the property issue, which still remained open. As a result,
the Sudeten Germans could not ask the German government for compensation. 152 Czech
victims are also waiting for compensation and they should be compensated by Germany
for World War II suffering. However, the Czech Republic can not get any compensation
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because it has not been willing to reject President Benes's decrees which remain as a part
of the Czech legal system, and because the Sudeten German issue is still open.
On the Czech side, there was an official tendency to draw a thick line under
history resulting from Havel's view that the communist regime stayed in power not only
because of ruling communists, but also because everyone complied with the regime in
153
some way, although only formally. A similar approach was applied in foreign policy.
A tendency was to make a thick line and solve the historical events, like the Sudeten
German issue, once and for all.
In April 1995, Foreign Minister Zieleniec informed the executive board of the
Civic Democratic Party154 that the Czech Republic would start negotiations with
Germany. The chairman of the party, Mr. Klaus, was against this idea because he thought
that Social Democrats could totally destroy any plans for Czech-German reconciliation.
Despite this, negotiations started and Mr. Alexander Vondra, deputy of the Czech
Foreign Minister, along with Mr. Peter Hartman, Foreign Minister of the German Foreign
Office, started to meet regularly in June 1995. Czech Prime Minister V&clav Klaus
assured that negotiations would be held at the government level, and not on the level of
the Czech government versus Sudeten Germans.
Very soon after, governments of both countries took over the preparation of the
Czech-German declaration, which should be worked out and passed by parliaments of
both countries. At the beginning of August 1995, Czech Prime Minister Klaus said that it
was not enough to deal with Czech-German relations on parliamentary level only, but it
153
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was necessary to deal with it on the governmental level also. 155 When the negotiations at
the "deputy level" were at a stand stile, German Foreign Minister Kinkel and his Czech
colleague Zieleniec announced in January 1996 they had taken over the negotiation
process and wanted to finish negotiations soon. 156
The Chairman of the German opposition party SPD, Rudolf Scharping, claimed
the Czech-German declaration would be settled in only a few weeks. 157 Czech coalition
parties together with opposition Social Democrats had a similar but not so optimistic
opinion. They stated that the declaration could be signed by the general elections in the
Czech Republic in May 1996. 158
In September 1995, President Havel visited the eastern part of Germany and gave
a speech in Dresden. He commented that Czechs and Germans from former German
Democratic Republic could easily understand each other because of their common
communist history and their similar feelings of freedom, democracy, hopes, and mutual
understanding after the fall of communist regimes. He expressed the idea that life under
communism led to a weakened individual responsibility, and therefore, to such causes as
growing nationalism, xenophobia, and racism in countries with a communist history. He
154 He was a member of this party and a member of its executive board, so he informed his colleagues
within the party highest executive body.
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said that since Czechs and East Germans shared negative historical experience with
communist totalitarianism it helped to develop more accurate perceptions of each other's
position. He hoped that the western part of Germany would understand its eastern
neighbor, as the eastern part could, and all Europe would not miss the historic chance to
become a continent of peaceful cooperation based on equality. He stated, "one of the
problems of the Czech-German relationship consists of a lack of knowledge of and
understanding for each other's situation." 159
The first crisis developed in January 1996 when German Foreign Minister Klaus
Kinkel issued some new demands, although both sides had stated the declaration was
almost completed. He also said that the Potsdam Agreement was not a legal document
and not binding for Germany.
The Deputy Chairperson of the Bundestag, Mrs. Antje Vollmer, member of the
Alliance 90/Green Party, reacted to Mr. Kinkel's statement that Sudeten German property
issue remain open. In the middle of January 1996, she said that Bonn government
coalition had clearly rejected preparing the declaration during the meeting held on 20
December 1995. She also stated that the Czech side was very cooperative and, according
to information she had, the declaration consisted of everything Germany would want:
regret for the German expulsion, condemnation of committed crimes during the transfer,
and moral dissociation from Benes's decrees. According to her, Czechs would not accept
other demands. 160
159
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Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec indirectly accused Germany of
complicating the signing of the Czech-German declaration. He also said that except for
the view on the past, there was nothing important that needed more negotiations. 161
Minister Zieleniec further accused Germany of graduating its requirements. According to
him, Germany's approach was a result of development within Germany where forces
against the declaration were louder than its supporters. 162
The Co-chairman of Free Democrats and former Czech Foreign Minister, Mr.
Jin Dienstbier, believed he could not see any problems with Germany having stated new
requirements, however he saw a problem with Chancellor Kohl who had only a narrow
majority in the Bundestag and needed CSU, which did not want to lose its absolute
majority in Bavarian parliament. 164 He also said that Czechs could not be afraid of some
property claims because the Czech-German Agreement clearly stated both sides promised
not to allow the results of the war to be solved by new lawlessness. 165
As a reaction to Mr. Zieleniec statements, German Foreign Minister Kinkel said
that he had expected the Czech side would dissociate from Benes's decrees as an
exchange for German rejections of all Sudeten German property claims. Other demands
addressing lawlessness after World War II, had to be called by their right name. Kinkel
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required moral dissociation from the 1946 problematic law about amnesty and from the
Benes's decrees. Kinkel stated that "thick line under history" which the Czech side asked
for was impossible for legal reasons. He also mentioned that the Potsdam Agreement was
only a political statement, not binding for Germany.
Franz Neubauer, representative of Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft (SL), 166
said that current difficulties were produced by Prague, requiring everything, but
unwilling to give anything.
167
According to Mr. Kinkel, Prague claimed the forced
transfer of Germans had been all right from the legal point of view, because it had been
backed by the Potsdam Agreement. Mr. Kinkel thought this statement was not true. 168 A
spokesman of the parliamentary faction CDU/CSU, Mr. Lamers, said that a different
approach to the Potsdam Agreement sprang from the Czech unwillingness to admit the
Sudeten German transfer had been unlawful. 169
It seemed from this accusation exchange made by both Foreign Ministers that
both countries had, first, very different approaches to history and, secondly, a different
approach to negotiations. While the Czech side conducted negotiations in close
cooperation within the entire coalition and with the opposition Social Democrats, the
German side probably did not seek a wider agreement within its government coalition.
166
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When the German Foreign Minister submitted a draft of the declaration to the
government coalition, it, especially its Bavarian part, found it insufficient. 170 This then
led to other demands and consequently to accusing statements from both sides.
Additionally, Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl
were probably not able to establish good relationship with each other. When Mr. Klaus
planed to visit Germany in January 1996, the meeting with Mr. Kohl was not scheduled,
even though, the situation needed it because of the Foreign Ministers mutual accusations.
It was not the first time for both statesmen to be unwilling to meet. Mr. Klaus and Mr.
Kohl had not met for the past three years, so both sides did not follow the provisions of
the 1992 agreement in which annual meetings at the level of Prime Ministers were to be
held.
171
Three victorious powers from World War n, Great Britain, USA, and Russia,
backed the Potsdam Agreement. The British and Americans also stated that decisions
made in this agreement resulted from international law. Moreover, American and French
sides considered the Potsdam Agreement as a historical fact. 172 Statements of victorious
powers were not so significant for Czech-German relations and the development of the
declaration, but the German's and Czech's approach to this issue was more important.
Kinkel's opinion about the Potsdam Agreement was in discrepancy with
statements from the United States, Great Britain, and Russia, a successor of the Soviet
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Union. Their Prague Embassies stated that this agreement had authorized and agreed to
the Sudeten German transfer. 173 Allegedly, a positive change in Czech-German relations
came because World War II victorious powers replied to Kinkel's statement about the
Potsdam agreement. Their reply backed the Potsdam Agreement but weakened the
German position. 174
According to some sources, Helmut Kohl did not want to do anything related to a
declaration development until the summer when the Czech elections would be over.
Antje Vollmer, Deputy Chairperson of the Bundestag and Green Party Bundestag
member, and Kurt Biedenkopf, Prime Minister of Saxony and CDU member, had the
1 1f*
same opinions.
The process of the Czech-German Declaration was affected by the Czech 1996
election campaign. It was hoped, especially from the German side, that Czech-German
relations and the Sudeten German issue would not become the main issue during Czech's
election campaign, however the opposite happened. All political parties used more or less
the fear of Sudeten Germans during the 1996 election campaign. Communists and
Republicans tried to scare people in believing that if a coalition received support, it
would finish the Czech-German declaration process and Sudeten Germans could return to
the Czech Republic. Coalition parties stated that they were not willing to negotiate with
173
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Sudeten Germans, and Benes's decrees were unchangeable, but that the declaration would
solve the Sudeten German issue if it were signed.
Political parties were careful in their statements because they were familiar with
public opinion. Only seven percent of the people verified they would be willing to vote
for a party supporting an idea of apology to Sudeten German; whereas, eighty six percent
of people would not vote for such a party. 177 German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel
declared that Germany would not require any conditions for its support for the Czech
Republic to become a part of the European Union (EU) or a NATO member. Mr. Kinkel
reacted to recent statements by Bavarian politicians, who had asked to make connection
between German's support for the Czech Republic EU and NATO membership and the
Sudeten German issue. CSU Bundestag Deputy Chairman Hans Klein said he believed
the declaration of Czech-German relations was not necessary, and it was only a
1 78
superfluous paper.
After elections, the situation was unclear because the government coalition, which
started the process of creating a declaration, did not get a majority in parliament. 179 The
situation was uncertain and discussion about new early elections started. Therefore
German Chancellor Kohl stated in Bundestag on 11 September 1996 that the Federal
Republic of Germany wanted to finish the Czech-German declaration by the end of that
year. He called for the opposition and also government FDP members to have patience
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during future negotiations with the Czech Republic. He also confirmed full support for
the EU membership of the Czech Republic. Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus replied
to Kohl's statement by saying that negotiations were continuing at the level of negotiators
who worked on details. 181 Czech President Havel appreciated German Chancellor Helmut
Kohl's wish to conclude a declaration process by the end of the year. Josef Lux, chairman
of the Czech Christian Democrats, considered it important for the agreement to exceed
coalition accord and for the opposition to also take part in the declaration discussion. 182
German FDP 183 Chairman Wolfgang Gerhardt said that Prague had complied with the
transferred Germans, and now he expected the Bavarian government of CSU leader
Edmund Stoiber to take a positive attitude towards the declaration. 184
Mr. Kohl said that the Czech side should openly speak about the post-war German
transfer in the declaration. The Czech daily "Pravo" expressed that more open statement
about Czech post-war history was not so important for Germans, but that the
Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft and Bavarian CSU wanted the Czech side to admit
that the German transfer, approved by victorious powers in Potsdam, was basically
expulsion: it means an unlawful act. The Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft
180
"Kohl dice letos dokoncit deklaraci, (Kohl Wants to Complete the Declarations This Year)," Pravo,
12 September 1996.
181
"Klaus: Text jeste piluji ufednici, (Klaus: Clerks Still Work on the Text)," Pravo, 12 September 1996.
182
"Havel, Kalvoda a Lux chtejf deklaraci do konce roku, (Havel, Kalvoda, and Lux Want to Finish the
Declaration by the End of Year)," Pravo, 13 September 1996.
183 FDP had been the junior partner in the government coalition with CDU/CSU since 1982.
184
"Kohl chce letos dokoncit deklaraci, (Kohl Wants to Complete the Declarations This Year)," Pravo,
12 September 1996.
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representatives would deduce from that admission the rejection of Benes's decrees, the
right of transferred Germans to return and get at least part of their property back. 185
On 13 September 1996, the German coalition agreed that the declaration should
be signed by the end of that year and discussions with the Czech side should continue.
Mr. Kinkel was chosen as German leader for these negotiations; nonetheless, different
opinions from SL sources and government sources were issued about other points of the
coalition negotiations. A spokesman of Mr. Stoiber said that the Czech side admitted the
expulsion (vyhnani) of Germans as lawlessness and the possibility for Sudeten
Germans to live permanently in the Czech Republic. He also said Mr. Kinkel was
entrusted with preparation of a discussion forum between Czechs and Sudeten Germans.
A German government spokesman, Mr. Hausman, denied all of Mr. Stoiber's spokesman
statements and declared they were not results of that coalition meeting.
Different representatives of German political parties had different opinions on the
readiness of the declaration. CSU chairman and Finance Minister of Kohl's cabinet, Theo
Waigel, proclaimed on 9 October 1996 that it was not necessary to rush with the Czech-
German declaration, there would be nothing wrong, if it were signed next year. The new
chairman of the opposition SPD party, Mr. Lafontaine, said that his party trusted
Chancellor Kohl's word about the signing of the declaration by the end of the year. 1 8
185
"Kohl promluvil, Klaus upfesnuje, (Kohl said, Klaus Makes It Precise)," Pravo, 13 September 1996.
186 German television channel ARD mentioned similar opinion at the beginning of September 1996. It said
that the Czech Foreign Minister Zieleniec accepted the term expulsion long time ago. "Kohl chce letos
dokoncit deklaraci, (Kohl Wants to Complete the Declarations This Year)," Pravo, 12 September 1996.
187
"Nemecti mluvci se pfou o licast sudetskych NSmcu na jednani s CR, (German Spokesman Disputes
about Sudeten German Participance in Negotiations with the Czech Republic)," Pravo, 13 September 1996.
188
"Vefirne, ze Kohlovo slovo platf, (We Believe That Kohl's Word Is Valid)," Pravo, 10 October 1996.
At the beginning of October, the Chairman of German Social Democrats (SPD),
Oscar Lafontaine, visited the Czech Republic stating the CSU trials to delay the
declaration process could threaten the entire Czech-German reconciliation process. He
also repeated SPD support for the Czech Republic to join EU and NATO. Czech
parliament chairman Milos Zeman denied the declaration contained double citizenship
for Sudeten Germans and rejection of Benes's decrees. 189
After the Mr. Lafontaine's visit, the chairmen of the coalition parties and the
chairman of Social Democrats met with President Havel to discussed the Czech-German
declaration. Some disagreements came up during that meeting. Allegedly, Mr. Klaus
accused President Havel, Mr. Lux, and Mr. Kalvoda190 of being too open-minded or
willing to give in to all German demands. Foreign Minister Zieleniec received opinions
from politicians present at that meeting on the way to continue the negotiations for the
declaration with Germany. 191
The Bavarian Prime Minister and one of the CSU leaders, Edmund Stoiber, said
on 23 October 1996 there was no necessity to conclude the declaration process.
According to him it did not matter if the declaration would be by the end of year or next
year or in three years. It would not hurt Czech-German relations. 192
189
"Lafontaine: Zdrzovaci pokusy CSU ohrozuji sblizovani s CR, (Lafontaine: CSU Delay Attempts
Threaten Reconciliation with the Czech Republic)," Pravo, 10 October 1996.
190
Mr. Lux was a chairman of the Christian Democratic Party and Mr. Kalvoda was a chairman of the
Civic Democratic Alliance. Both parties were members of governing coalition.
191
"Koalice jednala s Vaclavem Havlem i o malych zmenach v deklaraci, (Coalition Discussed with Vaclav
Havel Also Small Changes in the Declaration)," Pravo, 10 October 1996, and "Pfi schuzce na Hrade se strhl
spor o deklaraci, (Dispute about the Declaration Occurred During the Meeting at the Prague Castle)," Pravo
11 October 1996.
192
"Stoiber: Termih podpisu deklarace nenf nalehavy, (Stoiber: Date of the Declaration Signing Is Not
Important)," Mlada fronta DNES, 24 October 1996.
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Negotiations quite successfully continued, so on 5 December 1996, German
Chancellor Helmut Kohl met with representatives of Sudeten Germans to observe the last
version of the Czech-German declaration before its signing. The Deputy Chairperson of
the Bundestag, Antje Vollmer, blamed Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft and Bavarian
CSU for making the declaration acceptance impossible. She said the entire delay was
ninety percent because of CSU and the rest was Mr. Kohl's hesitation. 193
The text of the declaration was kept secret and its content was not available, even
to parliament members. It was quite surprising when a German television channel, ARD,
made the declaration public. Czech Foreign Minister Zieleniec confirmed it had issued
genuine content from the declaration, and, in his opinion, this was last version of the
declaration and nothing would change in it. 194 There were two speculations of why the
declaration was made public. The first one said Helmut Kohl wanted to quickly and
definitively disable other Sudeten Germans attempts, especially Sudetendeutsche
Landsmannschaft, to change the declaration. 195 The second one said the declaration was
made public by the Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft, because it hoped the declaration
would not be signed. Allegedly, they thought the content of the declaration could create
negative reactions on the Czech side and therefore the declaration would not be signed. 196
193
"Kanclef sezn£mil sudetsk6 Nemce se znenim deklarace, (Chancellor Acquired Sudeten Germans with
the Text of the Declaration)," Mlad£ fronta DNES, 6 December 1996.
194
Mocek, Michal and Palata, Lubos\ "Deklarace je smelejsi nez se ocekavalo, (The Declaration Is More
Audacious than It Was Expected)," MladS fronta DNES, 10 December 1996.
195
"Zneni cesko-nemecke deklarace zfejme uniklo z Kohlova ufadu, (The text of the Czech-German
Declaration Leaked from the Kohl's Office)," Mlada fronta DNES, 1 1 December 1996.
196
"SudetSf Nemci deklaraci dale odmftaji, (Sudeten Germans Are Still Refusing the Declaration)," Mlada
fronta DNES, 12 December 1996.
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On 1 1 December 1996, the leader of the Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft stated
his organization rejected the Czech-German declaration as it was at that time.
Representatives of Bavarian CSU said that the declaration was a contribution to mutual
Czech-German relation, however the CSU had to support it only if other requirements for
Sudeten Germans were added. For example, Bavarian Minister for Labor, Barbara
Stamm, commented that CSU could back the declaration if the Czech side would start
dialogue with Sudeten Germans. 197
The Czech side was satisfied, because in its opinion, it had enforced its idea of "a
thick line after history" because both parties agreed they would not encumber their
political and legal relations with questions from the past and both countries would respect
the legal system of other country.
198
It meant for the Czech side inviolability of Benes's
decrees.
The Czech government approved the Czech-German declaration in its meeting on
17 December 1996. Prime Minister Klaus stated the government considered this
document as a final one and there was no reason to change anything. The German
government approved the declaration unanimously on 18 December 1996. 199
On 20 December 1996 German and Czech Foreign Ministers, Mr. Kinkel and Mr.
Zieleniec, signed the Czech-German declaration. Mr. Kinkel said that he was satisfied
with the declaration which exceeded the 1992 interstate agreement. He stated that the
declaration did not mean past injustices would be forgotten and should not encumber
197
"Bavorsko podminene podpofilo deklaraci, (Bavaria Conditionally Supported the Declaration)," Mladl
frontaDNES, 17 December 1996.
198
Mocek, Michal and Palata, LuboS, "Deklarace je smSlejsi nez se doposud cekalo, (The Declaration Is
More Audacious than It Was Expected)," Mlad& fronta DNES, 10 December 1996.
199
"Spolkova vl&da souhlasi, (Federal Government Agrees)," Lidov6 noviny, 20 December 1996.
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future mutual relations. He also stated Germany would support the Czech Republic EU
and NATO membership. 200
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus signed
the Czech-German declaration on 21 January 1997. Vaclav Klaus said the declaration
was a clear and understandable statement on how both countries saw the past and the
future, and any new input would shift the declaration in a different direction. He also said
that some different points of view on some questions remained. Helmut Kohl surprised
the Czech side when he stated that the property issue connected to the German transfer
from Czechoslovakia was not closed. He said, "the property questions remain open." 201
Later during the approving process in Bundestag, Chancellor Kohl stated Bonn respected
the Czech legal system and he also said " in property questions, each party remains bound
by its legal system and it respects that the other party has different legal opinions."202 He
also mentioned there were a lot of questions that could not be solved by the declaration
203
and the declaration "was not a thick line in any case."
On 30 January 1997, the German Bundestag approved the Czech-German
declaration by overwhelming majority. 204 The Bavarian CSU wanted to add some
200
Kinkel, Klaus, "Spolecne utvafenf evropsk6 budoucnosti, (Common Creation of European Future),"
Mlad& fronta DNES, 21 December 1996, and "S deklaracf je spokojen jak Kinkel tak i nemectf Zide,
(Kinkel just as German Jews Are Satisfied with the DeclaraUon)," Mlad& fronta DNES, 31 December 1996.
201
"Klaus s Kohlem podepsali deklaraci, (Klaus and Kohl Signed the Declaration)," Pr£vo, 22 January
1997.
02
Mocek, Michal, "Ve Spolkov6m snSmu proSla deklarace jasnou vStsmou, (The Declaration Was Passed
by Clear Majority in the Bundestag)," Mlad£ fronta DNES, 31 January 1996.
"Klaus s Kohlem podepsali deklaraci, (Klaus and Kohl Signed the Declaration)," Pr£vo, 22 January
1997.
4
There were 578 out of 672 Bundestag members for the declaration and only twenty were against.
92
205
accompanying explanatory text to the declaration, while the Czech House of Deputies
Chairman Milos Zeman, publicly supported by German SPD, tried to enforce his version
of accompanying text; however, both attempts were not successful. Politicians throughout
the German political spectrum asked the Czech side to start discussion with Sudeten
Germans. Minister Kinkel claimed that most Sudeten Germans had been ready for
reconciliation from the beginning. Also Bundestag Deputy Chairperson Mrs. Vollmer
directly asked the Czech side for negotiations with Sudeten Germans. Bavarian CSU also
welcomed the declaration. CSU chairman Theo Waigel said the solution to vote for or
against was not made easy. Bavarian Prime Minister Stoiber said that despite the
indubitable imperfections the declaration was a building block for the future. 206
Czech Social Democrats stated that the Czech-German declaration would be more
acceptable to the Czech Social Democratic Party parliament members if the government
worked out a report explicitly explaining some disputable points of the declaration and
disabling interpretations that would cast doubt on post-war arrangement and its legal
foundations.
207
Social Democrats then made an effort to force the House of Deputies to
approve an introductory statement to the Czech-German declaration. The discussion in
the House covered this issue, but it was also full of attacks and accusations from the
Republican Party side. The coalition Civic Democratic Party made a compromise,
withdrew its own introductory statement, and supported the Social Democratic one. This
5
"Stoiber: CSU trva na prohl&senf k deklaraci, (Stoiber: CSU Insists on Pronouncement to the
Declaration)," Pravo, 23 January 1997.
206
Mocek, Michal, "Bonn deklaraci vita, vyzyv£ vSak k jednani se sudetskymi Nemci, (Bonn Welcomes
the Declaration. However It Challenges to Negotiations with Sudeten Germans)," Mlada fronta DNES,
31 January 1997.
>7
"CSSD pozaduje upfesneni spornych bodu deklarace, (CSSD Asks for Specification Disputable Points
of the Declaration), Pravo, 20 January 1997.
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contributed to the approval of the declaration by 131 votes. 208 Czech Senate approved the
Czech-German declaration without any introductory statement.
Minister Zieleniec stated the declaration did not have, in comparison to an
agreement, international-legal results, but it was a political and moral commitment for
Czech and German governments. He admitted the declaration could not entirely solve
209
property questions.
The exchanges of presidential speeches in reciprocal parliaments were the last
stage of the Czech-German declaration process. On 24 April 1997, Czech President
Havel gave a speech in Bundestag and on 29 April 1997, German President Herzog spoke
to a joint session of the House of Representatives and Senate at Prague Castle.
In February 1997, Mr. Wilfried Antusch, judge of German Supreme State Court
in Munich, commented that the Czech-German declaration was not only a political
statement, but also an international treaty since the declaration had been signed by
representatives of two nations as a binding treaty.210
Both sides welcomed the Czech-German declaration and appreciated its
contribution for future mutual relation. At the same time, they realized there were
different opinions on different issues, different legal systems to be accepted, and a thick
line was not a thick line because some issues remained open. Different opinions and
names for the post-war transfer of Germans remained in Czech and German versions of
'
"Deklarace byla pfijata jasnou vetsinou hlasu, (The Declaration Was Passed by the Clear Majority of
Votes)," Mlada fronta DNES, 15 February 1997.
"Deklarace byla pfijata jasnou vetsinou hlasii. (The Declaration Was Passed by the Clear Majority of
Votes)," Mlada fronta DNES, 15 February 1997.
210
Kovaffk, Jan, "Deklarace je i mezinarodni smlouvou, prohlisil nemecky soudce Antusch, (The
Declaration Is also an International Agreement, German Judge Antusch Stated)," Pravo, 26 February 1997.
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the declaration. Additionally, some forces on both sides tried to add some explanatory
amendments to the declaration since they thought it necessary to explain and interpret the
declaration indicating that the approximate two-year work had been incomplete or wrong.
For example, in March 1997, the German Ambassador in Prague, Anton Rossbach, said
there were interpretations in the government report and speeches of Mr. Klaus and Mr.
Zieleniec in the Czech parliament not in accord with the Czech-German declaration and
this should not be repeated in the future. Social Democratic parliament member Pavel
Dostai, Czech Social Democratic parliament member, immediately reacted by stating he
hoped this was not an official attitude of the German side because, in this case, the Czech
Social Democratic Party would have to revise its approach to the declaration. 211 This little
word exchange proved the declaration did not successfully overcome disputable points
and almost nothing had changed.
Almost half a year after signing the Czech-German declaration, German Foreign
Minister Kinkel issued an article related to the Czech-German relations in the German
daily, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. He gave responses to questions, which either
remained unanswered or were neglected during the negotiation process of the Czech-
German declaration. He felt the declaration opened the possibility for compensation for
Czech victims of Nazism.212 He also pointed out that nobody, including Sudeten
211
"Cesky vyklad deklarace neodpovfdS zcela textu, soudf velvyslanec SRN v CR, (The Czech Explanation
of the Declaration Is Not Fully in Accord with the Text, German Ambassador in the Czech Republic
Said)," Prlvo, 24 March 1997.
212
This was not so clearly mentioned before. Attitude of the German side in past was that Czech victims
were compensated by the Czech government and that financial means of the Fun for Future should be used
for other activities.
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Germans, could be excluded from the Discussion Forum prepared in accordance with the
213
declaration.
Germany put 140 million German marks into the Fund for the Future which
would be established according to the Czech-German declaration. The Czech side would
contribute twenty or twenty-five million German marks. 214 Both sides would be equal in
the decision-making process connected with this fund. This financial means could be
used for the Czech-Nazi victims but above all for youth exchange actions, ecological
215
activities, education, culture, etc.
In the middle of August 1997, German Foreign Minister Kinkel announced the
first steps for realization of the Fund for Future and the Discussion Forum started to be
form.
216 Czech Prime Minister and the German Chancellor stated, after the signing of the
declaration, the declaration results would be introduced in the near future, but the
practical realization process was quite slow.
Discussions about the Fund for the Future lasted almost one year because of the
reluctant approach of German CSU. However the opposition SPD forced the
establishment of the fund, approved within the Czech-German declaration. Moreover, the
coalition FDP did not agree with postponing Nazi victim indemnification. Therefore the
German side finally announced that the German Ambassador in Prague would deliver the
213
Tigrid, Pavel, "Nedvojsmysln£ slova pana ministra Kinkela, (Unambiguous Words of Minister Kinkel),"
Mlada frontaDNES, 15 August 1997.
4
According to negotiations between Foreign Ministers Kinkel and Zieleniec, the Czech side should
contribute 440 million Czech crowns which equals roughly 23 million German marks
215
"Zieleniec str£vil vfkend s Kinkelem, (Zieleniec Spent a Weekend with Kinkel)," Mlada" fronta DNES,
24 February 1997, and Mocek, Michal and Palata, LuboS: "Deklarace je smSlejsf nez se doposud cekalo,
(The Declaration Is More Audacious than It Was Expected)," Mlad& fronta DNES, 10 December 1996.
216
Kovafik, Jan, "Po pul roce od deklarace, (Half a Year from the Declaration)," Pr&vo, 13 August 1997.
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appropriate diplomatic note allowing the establishing of the fund from 1 January 1998. 217
The fund started to work but only formally because the German side selected its
representatives to the administrative board during January 1998.
The year 1998 was an election year in both countries. The Czech Republic held
early elections in June. Social Democratic Party became the strongest party (Table IH-1)
and formed a minority government with support from the "opposition" the Civic
Democratic Party. Social Democratic leader Milos Zeman became Prime Minister. On 26
July 1998, he commented on the members of German delegation in Discussion Forum
and said that there should be only people who supported the declaration. He stated,
"Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft does not belong to the organizations which
supported this declaration. And similarly to our side, there are neither Communists nor
Republicans, I can not see any reason why Landsmannschaft should be there from
German side." His statement created wide criticism in Germany where the campaign
for state elections and also September federal election took place. 219 Chancellor Kohl
declared such statements were fully unacceptable. He said Mr. Zeman probably did not
know what he was speaking about or he had used his statement for intra-political
disputes; regardless of which either way was wrong. He also said that if he met with Mr.
Zeman he would tell him how Germany did not envisage good relations between
neighbor states. Additionally Mr. Stoiber repeated his threat to block Czech membership
217
Stepankova, Ivana, "Fond sice vznikne l.ledna, ale musi take zacft pracovat, (The Fund Will Be Created
on 1
st
January, but It Has to Start Working)," Slovo, 29 December 1997.
218 „Co vlasmfi fekl Zeman, (What Did Mr. Zeman Actually Say)," Pravo, 5 August 1 998.
219 Mr.Zeman was criticized by German Finance Minister Theo Weigel, Saxon CDU representative Volker
Schrimpff, Bavarian Prime Minister Stoiber, chairman of German liberals (FDP) Volfgang Gerhard, and
also by Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel. "Kohl se pfidal ke kritice Zemana, (Kohl Joined the Critique of
Zeman)," Pravo, 5 August 1998.
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in the EU. Czech politicians took Stoiber's statement as not meant to be so serious, and
said Mr. Stoiber wanted to indicate that Mr. Zeman, as a Prime Minister, should be more
careful in his words.
22
Czech Prime Minister Zeman refused to react on Kohl's criticism and the Czech
government issued a statement that "the Czech Republic government would not comment
any statements made by German politicians which resulted from incorrect interpretation
of Mr. Zeman 's statement."
Table DOH: Results of the Election to the Czech Parliament Hold 20-21 June 1998
Parliament Political Party
CSSD (Social Democratic Party)
ODS (Civic Democratic Party)
KSCM (Communist Party)
KDU-CSL (Christian Democratic Party)
US (Freedom Union)
SPR-RSC (Republican Party)







Source: "Czech Election Results." Fact on File World News Digest, 6 August 1998, [Lexis-Nexis]:
EUROPE/ALLEUR [10 February 2000], p.l
.
The German Social Democrat Mr. Verheugen222 backed Mr. Zeman when he said
Zeman was a person willing to compromise and ensure majority during parliamentary
voting for the Czech-German declaration and that he also had his share in the Czech
NATO joining policy. He asked Premier Zeman to explain his statement and he
220 ,<
Kohl sepfidal ke kritice Zemana, (Kohl Joint Critique of Zeman)," Pravo, 5 August 1998.
221
"Do cesko-nemecke bitvy se zapojil i kanclef Kohl, (Chancellor Kohl Joined the Czech-German
Battle)," Mlada fronta DNES, 5 August 1998.
222
Mr. Verheugen was responsible within the Bundestag fraction of the SPD for foreign affairs and was the
spokesman on these affairs. In 1999, he became a member of the EU Commission, responsible for EU
enlargement.
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expressed belief for democratic reliability of Sudeten Germans. 223 Czech President
Vaclav Havel criticized the Chancellor and the Bavarian CSU for criticizing Prague to
get some votes for parliamentary elections. He said, "As Czech parliamentary elections
have shown, votes cannot be gotten though creating a negative picture of inhabitants of
neighbor country." 224
On 21 August 1998, Chancellor Helmut Kohl met with the chairman of the
Expellee Union, Erika Steinbach, and ensured Germans, transferred after World War II,
that negotiations with the Czech Republic and Poland regarding the European Union
would facilitate the solving of disputable bilateral problems. This should include the right
for a person to choose the place where he or she wants to live. Mrs. Steinbach asked
for a solution of disputable points before the Czech Republic and Poland joined European
Union. She said, "...the right for fatherland is more than only settlement freedom and
how the EU ensures it."226
Arguing about the Discussion Forum, which should be used for Czech-German
talks about mutual relations, was reflected in the German parliament during the
discussion of the Czech membership in NATO. A German CSU parliament member, Mr.
Schmidt, said that the Czech anti-German attitudes could complicate the process of
223
"Zeman by mel sve vyroky vysvetlit, ffka Verheugen, (Zeman Should Explain His Statements,
Verheugen says)," Mlada fronta DNES, 12 August 1998.
224
"President nepfimo odsoudil kanclefuv utok na Zemana, (The President Indirectly Condemned
Chancellor's Attack on Zeman)," Mladd fronta DNES, 14 August 1998, and "Havel odmftl roztrzku CR-
SRN a neprfmo kritizoval i kanclere, (Havel Rejected Czech-German Dispute and also Indirectly Criticized
Chancellor)," Pravo, 14 October 1998.
"Kohl i vyhnanci varovali Prahu, (Kohl and Expellees Warned Prague)," Mlad£ fronta DNES,
22 August 1998.
226
"Vstup CR a Polska do EU usnadni feseni otevfenyxh ot£zek, (Czech and Poland EU Membership Will
Make Solution of Open Question Easier)," Pr&vo, 22 August 1998.
99
joining NATO for the Czech Republic. 227 Despite this statement, most of the German
parliament members supported Czech membership in NATO. Nevertheless, a really
difficult time could be expected during negotiations of Czech membership in the EU
because German politicians, especially members of Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft
and Bavarian CSV, said that they would use every opportunity to enforced Sudeten
228Germans interests.




SPD (Social Democratic Party)
CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic Union/
Green Party
FDP (Free Democratic Party)
PDS (Communist Party)
Source: "German Victor yet to Show His Colours." Finance Week, 2 October 1998, [Lexis-Nexis]:
EUROPE/ALLEUR [10 February 2000], p.l.
The new German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder, who took over for Helmut Kohl
after the SPD victory in fall 1998 elections (results in Table ni-2), stated during the
meeting with Czech Prime Minister Zeman "agreement not to encumber mutual relations
with the past means that the past is closed." 229 He also said that requirements of expellee
organizations did not have any influence on German foreign policy and that the German







"Schmidt: Protinemecke postoje by mohly ztfzit CR vstup do Aliance, (Schmidt: Anti-German Attitudes
Could Make Czech Joining to Alliance Harder)," Pravo, 13 February 1998.
228
Mr. Neubauer expressed this threat after the ratification of the Czech-German declaration. "SudetSti
Nemci potvrdili svuj nesouhlas s deklaraci, (Sudeten Germans Confirmed Their Disagreement with the
Declaration)," Mlada fronta DNES, 10 February 1999.
229
Palata, LuboS, "Jistotu Schroder Praze d&t nemohl, (Schroder Could Not Give the Certainty to Prague),"
Mlada fronta DNES, 10 March 1999.
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and the support for the Czech EU membership was without any requirements. 230 The
Czech Prime Minister, on behalf of the Czech Republic government, distanced himself
from Benes's decrees when he said "the virtue of some legal norms passed after 1945 had
become extinct although they maintained as part of the Czech legal system." 231 The
Bundestag faction of the CDU/CSU criticized Mr. Schroder's statement and the leader of
CSU parliament members, Michael Glos, said that the Chancellor did not have a right to
give up the rights of expellees. The leader of Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft, Mr.
Neubauer, also rejected Mr. Schroder's statement and called for his resignation. It was
obvious that Mr. Schroder's statement did not solve the issue of Sudeten Germans
property claims because future German governments could deal with it in a totally
different way than the present government did. His statements were not backed by wide
majority within German Bundestag and it was clear that CDU/CSU had a different
opinion on this issue. If the CDU/CSU coalition formed the next German government,
the approach to this problem would be different and unsupportive to Mr. Schroder words.
The German Chancellor clearly denied requirements of transferred Sudeten
Germans to get their property back.232 In this case, if the German Constitutional Court
decision was considered, the German government would compensate all Sudeten
Germans transferred to Germany after World War II. Bundestag Deputy Chairperson
Mrs. Antje Vollmer responded that the process of reconciliation was irrevocable.
230
Palata, Lubos, "Bonnska tecka se rodila velice tSzce, (Bonn's Period Was Born in a Very Difficult
Way)," Mlada fronta DNES, 9 March 1999.
231
Palata, Lubos, "Zeman a Schroder udSlali te£ku za tSzkou minulosti, (Zeman and Schroder Made a
Period After Difficult Past)," Mlada fronta DNES, 9 March 1999.
2
Kovafik, Jan, "Schroder potvrdil, ze SRN nema majetkove pozadavky, (Schroder Confirmed that
Germany Does Not Have Any Property Demands)," Pravo, 9 March 1999.
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Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft representatives said that after rejection of property
claims towards the Czech Republic, the duty to compensate transferred Germans would
be shifted to the German federal government. Mrs.Vollmer labeled SL imaginations as
"entire legal and political nonsense" and felt certain that expellees would not be
successful with their suits. 233
Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft leader Mr. Neubauer criticized Schroder's
statement and said that Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft insisted on property
compensation.234 It is interesting to hear or to read statements of Sudetendeutsche
Landsmannschaft where they present demands to be fulfilled, but saying that property
claims are not the main point to consider. Contrarily, when one of their main demands
was met, such as dissociation with Benes's decrees, which not only Czech but also
German politicians and newspapers confirmed, they started to focus on the property
issue. This is not the way to finish this issue. Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft went
even further and stated that it would ask the UN Commission for Human Rights to clear
up the Czech-German issue according to international law.235
In March 1999, when the Czech Republic joined NATO, both sides felt that the
mutual relations were as good as never before. The Czech Foreign Minister, who visited
Sudeten German and Czech representatives meeting said, "we are now not only
3
"Proces smifeni s Cechy je nezvratny, fekla Vollmerova, (Process of Reconciliation with Czechs Is
Irreversible, Vollmer Said)," Pravo, 12 March 1999.
234
Kovafik, Jan, "Ngmecka media: Bonn a Praha se nyni zamefuji na budoucnost, (German Press: Bonn
and Prague Focus on Future Now)," Pravo, 10 March 1999.
"Odsunutf NSmci si stezuji komisi OSN pro lidska prava, (Transferred Germans Complain to UN
Committee for Human Rights)," Pravo, 22 March 1999.
36
It was the 8
th
volume of this kind of a meeting held in the town of Jihlava in South Moravia. Mr. Kavan,
the new Foreign Minister, was the first Czech government representative who visited this meeting.
Previous government representatives avoided such opportunity to meet with Sudeten Germans.
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neighbors and partners but also allies within the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization." 237
He mentioned events where interpretations would probably never be agreed upon, but
this was not an obstacle for the Czech-German dialogue.
In April 1999, the European parliament asked the Czech Republic to reject
Benes's decrees. The Czech president, as well as other Czech politicians, refused it and
said that whatever part those decrees had in the Czech legal system they had become
extinct; moreover, Czech-German relations were now determined by the Czech-German
declaration.
Newly elected German President Johannes Rau was quite in favor of the Czech
Republic when he said there was not any dread, fear, or political prejudice which could
delay the joining of the Czech Republic to the European Union. He also denied
conditioning the Czech membership by rejection of Benes's decrees. 23
At the end of September, German Chancellor Schroder visited the Czech Republic
and met with Czech Prime Minister Zeman. In accordance with the statement, expressed
by both politicians during Mr. Zeman 's visit in Germany, the problems of the past would
not encumber present and future relations; they did not discuss anything about
compensation or the Sudeten German issue. Both politicians appreciated cooperation
with the other side. Mr. Schroder said "cooperation is excellent." 239 Mr. Zeman called
relations between the Czech Republic and Germany as "above standard." They signed a
57
"SudetSti Nemci pfijeli rokovat o usmlfeni. (Sudeten Germans Came to Discuss about Reconciliation),"
Mlada fronta DNES, 29 March 1999.
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Palata, LuboS, "OdskodnSnf je v ceskem zajmu, fekl Rau, (Compensations Are in Czech Interest),"
Mlada fronta DNES, 9 September 1999.
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cultural agreement and they would sign an agreement for cooperation in education and
social sphere in the near future.
240
German coalition parties prepared a resolution to Czech-German relations. It was
a less strong version of the confrontational suggestion made by the opposition, but it also
asked for rejection of Benes's decrees. The opposition version asked the German
government to request the rejection of Benes's decrees as a condition for Czech EU
membership. The coalition version asked for rejection indirectly and said that the German
parliament should express support to reform endeavors of the Czech Republic, but that it
should ask to accord its legal norms with the European Union norms before joining it. 241
Mr. Schroder and Mr. Zeman criticized the opposition version of the resolution during
Mr. Schroder's visit to the Czech Republic.
According to a German weekly magazine, "Der Spiegel", President Havel became
a defender of Benes's decrees. The President said the Czech-German declaration was
signed saying the past will not influence future relations between both countries. 242
Giinter Verheugen, German European Union Commissioner, advised the Czech
Republic to negotiate with Sudeten Germans. He said that he did not think the dialogue
with Sudeten Germans could mean any threat or risk for the Czech Republic, but it could
stop some German accusing the Czech side of not wanting to discuss or negotiate with
240
Agreement about cooperation in education and social sphere covers such fields as easier possibility for
Czech students to study at German universities, and the same rights and conditions for Czechs working in
Germany as German citizens have.
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243 He said that this topic would not be part of the Czech Republic
integration process.
Johann Bohm was elected a new spokesman of the Sudetendeutsche
Landsmannschaft (SL). He would replace Franz Neubauer who resigned because of
health problems. Mr. Bohm is a member of Trustee Board of the Czech-German Fund for
the Future and chairman of the Bavarian parliament. The Sudeten German issue is still
open for him and he has asked the Czech side to start official negotiations with expelled
Germans. Mr. Bemd Posselt replaced Mr. Neubauer as new chairman of the SL. He is
member of the Bavarian CSU and a member of the European parliament. He represents
the new generation of Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft members who does not have
any connection with the Czech Republic. 244 Mr. Posselt will probably follow the direction
determined by his predecessor. Shortly after he took office, the Sudetendeutsche
Landsmannschaft issued a statement "...the European Union should deal with Prague




During the last years after the revolution in Czechoslovakia and its consequent
splitting into two countries, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, the Czech
243
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Republic went through a process of transition to democracy. The issue of the Czech-
Sudeten German relations ran through the entire ten-year period. In 1990, Czechoslovak
President, Vaclav Havel, started a reconciliation process by his apology to the expelled
Sudeten Germans. However, the Czechoslovak-German Agreement from 1992 did not
consider it, and later, the Czech-German declaration from 1997 did not solve anything
from the Czech-Sudeten German "dispute."
In 1998, German Social Democrats won elections in Germany and similarly,
Czech Social Democrats won elections in the Czech Republic. After that, the situation
regarding to the Czech-Sudeten German issue improved because of common opinions on
this issue on both sides. At the end of 1999, the situation in Czech-German relations was
estimated as the best since World War II. Czech Prime Minister Zeman called the
relations between the Czech Republic and Germany "above standard." But the opinion of
Czech-German relations regarding the Sudeten German issue from the point of view of
German opposition parties is different. Chancellor Schroder's statement in March 1999
did not solve this issue for the future. His statement is not legally binding and it is
probable that if CDU/CSU wins future elections, the change in approach to the Sudeten
German problem will be different. Also Mr. Zeman's statement concerning Benes's
decrees as distinct does not mean the Czech side rejected these decrees. They remain part
of the Czech legal system. Political parties, their attitudes and approaches to the Czech-
Sudeten German issue, seem to be the key players in the Czech-German reconciliation
process. Their ability to make a compromise and to accept opinions from the other side
will be very important in solving this issue.
political contacts with the Austrian government if the extremist right-wing Free Democtartic Party of




After the Communist coup in February 1948, a communist political model
affected the political life in Czechoslovakia. The three branches of power, executive,
legislative, and judicial, were substituted by the leading unified role of the Communist
Party, backed by a consequently changed constitution and supported by oppressive
institutions. Only a few other parties were allowed to exist within the so-called National
Front, but they did not have any power or influence.
As a result of the revolution in 1989, the Communist regime broke down all
together with its political party system. Previous Communist regime oppressed and
banned almost all political parties, therefore a democratic political system with a
diversity of political parties had to be established. The new Czech political parties were
founded and started building a democratic political system with plurality of opinions.
After 1989, the opportunity also opened for Germany to unify. The reunification
meant changes on the German political scene. West Germany political parties extended
their activities into the East Germany territory, some of the East German parties were
transformed, some of them coalesced with West German parties.
This chapter will describe political parties in the Czech Republic, as well as in
Germany, and their role and attitudes toward the Czech-German declaration and
reconciliation process. It will describe the basic principle and orientation of the parties,
how their members contributed or did not contribute to the creation of the declaration,
and what attitude each individual party has towards the Czech-German issue, especially
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post World War II history, the transfer of Germans, and the current process of
reconciliation.
B. CZECH POLITICAL PARTIES
Very soon after the velvet revolution in 1989, the variety of political parties was
established providing a foundation for a new political climate. First, free elections were
held in 1990 in former Czechoslovakia. Czech and Slovak political parties competed to
attract voters for their programs. In 1992 elections, the coalition of ODS-KDS246 won the
majority of votes in the Czech Republic. It created a government coalition with the Civic
Democratic Alliance (ODA) and the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's
Party (KDU-CSL). ODS chairman, Vaclav Klaus, became the Prime Minister. This
government coalition played a leading role in process of creating the Czech-German
declaration.
After the split of Czechoslovakia in 1993, the Czech Republic accepted a new
constitution, which explicitly defined civil rights, the relationship between the executive
and legislative branches of power, and the independence of the judiciary.
Sixteen political parties and movements participated in the 1996 elections. Six of
them obtained the necessary five percent or more of popular vote to become a
parliamentary party. The ruling coalition from the 1992 elections received 99 seats in the
Chamber of Deputies and 52 seats in the Senate. Vaclav Klaus became the Prime
Minister again, and the government tried to finish the transformation process and
complete the process of reconciliation with Germany.
246 ODS stands for Civic Democratic Party and KDS stands for Christian Democratic Party. Both parties
later coalesced and ODS absorbed KDS.
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In December 1997, the coalition was forced to resign because of a long-term
disagreement, scandals with financing of the parties, and the economic worsening of
performance in the Czech Republic. A new temporary government of Mr. Tosovsky, the
former governor of the Czech National Bank, was created in January 1998 and its task
was to prepare the early elections.
In June 1998, early elections were held and the Czech Social Democratic Party
(CSSD) gained the majority of votes. The following negotiations did not lead to the
formation of any coalition and finally CSSD formed a minority government formally
supported by a procedural agreement made with ODS. The leader of CSSD, Milos
Zeman, was appointed Prime Minister and a left-wing party ruled the country for the first
time after 1989 revolution.
1. Civic Democratic Party (ODS)
The Civic Democratic Party is a right wing conservative party founded in April
1991. It promotes a liberal economy without major state interventions. In the 1996
election, it became again the leading party within the coalition, but because of financial
scandal, some top party officials defected and formed a new party, the Freedom Union, in
January 1998. ODS conducted a big campaign for the 1998 early elections and succeeded
in stopping the decreasing trend in voters' support thus becoming the second strongest
party.
ODS wants strong ties with Western Europe, and supports NATO and European
Union membership. It considers European Union membership as a key task in the
political and economic field. It says that Czech Republic relations with its neighbors are
very important and the Czech interest includes all neighbors becoming members of the
same political, economic, and security alliances as the Czech Republic. To keep good
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intensive and equal relations with Germany is very important not only because it is the
key country of European Union, but also because common history shows the importance
of this relationship and the benefit for relations within the Central European region.
As one of the coalition parties, ODS supported the Czech - German declaration
obviously because it was a government negotiated document. On the other hand, the
Prime Minister and a leader of Civic Democratic Party, Vaclav Klaus, was not a strong
supporter of the declaration because he saw Czech-German relations from an economic
point of view as positive. He did not want to start solving some problems and drawing
attention to any issue that could worsen these relations. In April 1996, he tried to
decrease the importance of the declaration by saying that it was only a small piece in the
entire mosaic of mutual relations and "the declaration does not have weightiness, which
is ascribed to, for me or my colleagues."247 He also expressed his different opinion on the
content of the declaration during a meeting of the chairmen of the coalition parties and
chairman of Social Democrats with President Havel in October 1996. Allegedly, Mr.
Klaus accused President Havel, Mr. Lux, and Mr. Kalvoda248 of being too open-minded
or willing to give in to all German demands. 249
During the entire almost two-year period, ODS denied the idea of negotiations
between the Czech government and Sudeten Germans. State Minister Zieleniec said that
247
Pudil, Tom£>, "Deklarace je pfecefiovana, tvrdi Klaus, (The Declaration Is Overestimated, Klaus
Claims)," Lidov6 noviny, 13 April 1996.
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Mr. Lux was a chairman of the Christian Democratic Party and Mr. Kalvoda was a chairman of the
Civic Democratic Alliance.
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"Koalice jednala s Viclavem Havlem i o malych zmenach v deklaraci, (Coalition Discussed with Vaclav
Havel Also Small Changes in the Declaration)," Pravo, 10 October 1996, and "Pfi schuzce na HradS se strhl
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the declaration was a starting point for future dialogue, but Sudeten German
250
organizations were not partners with the Czech government. Minister of Justice Nov&k
251
pointed out that the importance of Mr. Neubauer was overestimated.
Mr. Klaus and ODS members were also against any kind of accompanying
resolution to the declaration as he expressed it several times, such as, during the meeting
252
with Senate chairman Petr Pithart. On the other hand, Mr. Klaus was a realistic
politician who knew that coalition parties had only a minority in Czech parliament and
that it was necessary to seek some support among the opposition. It was obvious that he
could not find support among either Republicans or Communists, so he negotiated with
Mr. Zeman about Social Democrats' support of the declaration. ODS parliament members
criticized Mr. Klaus and refused an agreement made by him and Mr. Zeman that ODS
would support the accompanying resolution, if CSSD parliament members supported the
declaration. However there were some other members of ODS who considered support
for the resolution without any conditions. One of them was State Minister Zieleniec who
started to think about it after Chancellor Kohl's speech and the signing the declaration. 254
Korecky, Miroslav and MatouSkova, Mark6ta, "Boj o deklaraci necekane zacal, (The Fight for the
Declaration Unexpectedly Started)," Lidov6 noviny, 12 February 1997.
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2. Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-
CSL).
The Christian Democratic Union - Czechoslovak People's Party is successor to the
Catholic-oriented People's Party, which was active before World War II. It existed during
the Communist regime as a powerless party within the National Front. After the 1989
revolution, the party underwent internal transformation. Today, it presents itself as a
conservative party with a Christian social orientation. It supports the idea of a social
market economy. The party calls for completion of privatization, a balanced budget, and
gradual change from direct to indirect taxation.
The KDU-CSL, undoubtedly, supported the process of reconciliation with
Germany and the Czech-German declaration itself. The Chairman of the party, Josef Lux,
said that the situation was different in comparison with last century, and the Czech
Republic did not have to underline its emancipation endeavors and express its resistance
towards Germans. According to him, "non-supporting of this declaration means to be lost
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in Europe for the next century and to be prisoner of your own fear."
During the 1996 election campaign, KDU-CSL similarly like ODA did not have a
special paragraph about relations with Germany. They mentioned that they enforce close
cooperation with neighboring countries and the principle of solidarity.
After signing the declaration and Chancellor Kohl's speech stating that the
property issue was still open, Senate chairman and KDU-CSL member, Petr Pithart, said
that he believed the declaration wording, which the German chancellor had signed, was
5
Korecky, Miroslav and MatouSkovS Mark6ta, "Boj o deklaraci necekanS zacal, (The Fight for the
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Differently)," Mlada" fronta DNES. 9 April 1996.
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valid. The KDU-CSL chairman, Mr. Lux, said that it was certain that no one could doubt
the rights of the individual person, but the issue was finished at the political level. He
stated that any attempts to return with restitution claims before the year of 1948, or any
changes in Benes's decrees issue were impossible for the Czech side.257
3. Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA)
The ODA was established in 1991. It is right-wing neo-liberal party which
supports the integration of the Czech Republic into NATO and the European Union. It
favors a market economy. The ODA had internal problems after the coalition resignation
in December 1997 and it did not participate in the 1998 early elections.
During the 1996 election campaign, the ODA did not have a special paragraph
about relations with Germany as ODS did. The ODA maintained only general statements
that it wanted to keep and develop the best possible relations with all neighboring
258
countries.
The ODA, as both of its coalition partners, did not support an accompanying
resolution. The ODA parliament members thought that the parliament would change the
character of the Czech-German declaration, if it accepted an accompanying resolution.
They also criticized Mr. Zeman for not enforcing an accompanying resolution during his
visit to Germany. 259 Because they supported the equality of procedures in Germany and
in the Czech Republic, they said that if the German parliament had accepted an
257
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accompanying resolution, the Czech parliament could have accepted it too. Mr. Kroupa,
an ODA parliament member said that an accompanying resolution was useless because it
contributed nothing to the declaration. It consisted of everything that was mentioned
within the declaration.
260
The Civic Democratic Party, Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's
Party, and the Civic Democratic Alliance formed a coalition after 1992 and 1996
elections. They conducted policy as one unit; nevertheless, they had small differences in
opinions on some issues.
4. Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD)
The current Czech Social Democratic Party was reestablished in November 1989
as a successor to a party disbanded by the Communists in 1948. It supports a socially and
environmentally oriented and state-regulated economy. Although the party gained 26.4
percent of the votes in the 1996 election, it stayed in opposition. After the following
elections in 1998, it became the strongest party and formed a minority government.
The tasks of the party are to start up economic growth, to play an active role in the
fight against corruption and economic crime, to create a financial policy, to introduce
property admission, and to ensure independent courts.
It welcomes negotiations about the membership of the Czech Republic in the
European Union and considers it as one of the most important events in Czech history. It
also agrees with Czech NATO membership, which is a guarantee of security. It stresses
the importance of good relations with all neighboring countries. Social Democrats
consider the Agreement about a Good Neighborhood as a strong foundation for mutual
260
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Pronouncement Was Not Passed by Foreign Affairs Committee)," Mlad£ fronta DNES. 7 February 1997.
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relations and any kind of activities with Germany. They are clearly against any
discussions about World War II results, the results of the Potsdam Agreement, and
renewing disputes of the past.
At the beginning of the declaration creation period, Mr. Zeman thought that
negotiations would be held on the parliamentary level, so he and his party could be more
involved in it, but ODS pushed to move negotiations to the government level. In fact, it
was only one opposition party that was invited indirectly to take part in negotiations
about the Czech-German declaration. Its top representatives got acquainted with drafts of
the declaration, and party leader Milos Zeman was invited to the meeting of the coalition
party leaders with Czech President Vaclav Havel at the Prague Castle in fall 1996. 261
In January and February 1996 during the Potsdam Agreement discussions, Social
Democratic leader Zeman wanted to pass a parliamentary resolution against any
questioning of the Potsdam Agreement's validity. When coalition parties refused his
effort, he accused them of being financially supported by Germany262 and stated that the
present coalition was not able to defend Czech national interests.263 It was obvious that
Social Democrats wanted to use this topic within the election campaign. This led to some
statements by coalition politicians in which they had considered Social Democrats as
constructive opposition, but felt it probably was not true.264
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The CSSD had a more restrained attitude towards Germany, and its leader, Milos
Zeman, criticized the government for not being strong enough towards Germany. He said
that Mr. Neubauer statements were more aggressive since he was stimulated by the
ore
hesitation of the Czech coalition.
When the declaration was released in December 1996, the desire to support the
declaration was not very strong among Social Democrats, so they asked for an
accompanying resolution, explaining some points to prevent other interpretations of the
declaration. Mr. Zeman and the Social Democrats were threaten by President Havel's
reaction to their weak support for the declaration fearing that it would effect his
relationship to the Social Democratic Party. 266 Members of CSSD did not appear as one
decided unit in opinion and were divided into three groups in the support of the
declaration.
267 The first group supported the declaration without any accompanying
resolution. Within this group was Petra Buzkovl, Deputy Chairperson of Parliament, and
parliament members Pavel Dostcil and Zdenek Jicinsky.268 The second group supported
the declaration, but only if the accompanying resolution would be approved. The third
group consisted of Social Democrats who were against the declaration in all cases. The
individual opinions of the Social Democrats on the declaration changed over time. For
example, Stanislav Gross, leader of parliament Social democratic club, was one of the
1
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declaration critics after its release in December 1996, but then agreed that the declaration
would be acceptable with accompanying resolution.269 This split of opinion within the
Social Democratic Party led Mr. Zeman to state that the decision how to vote depended
270
on individual members. Some of the parliamentary members would not vote for the
declaration because it did not have support of the Czech public. 271 Chancellor Kohl's
statement, during the signing of the declaration, that the property issue remained open
strengthened the Social Democrats belief in an accompanying resolution.
During talks about participants in the Discussion Forum in summer 1998, Mr.
Zeman, leader of the Social Democrats and newly elected Prime Minister, said that he did
not see any reason why representatives of Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft should
participate in the Forum. According to German sources, he compared them with Czech
Communist and Republicans.272 His statement was later used in the German election
campaign focusing only on internal German matters until that time. 273
In March 1999, Mr. Zeman as Czech Prime Minister, on behalf of the Czech
Republic government, distanced himself from the Benes's decrees when he said that with
the maintaining of the Czech legal system continuity, the virtue of some legal norms,
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passed after 1945, had become extinct.274 It was a very diplomatic statement because he
did not use the term of Benes's decrees directly. He used the term legal norms passed
after 1945, which was understood as a rejection of these decrees.
5. The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM)
The Communist Party distanced itself from the 1948 - 1989 period, but it has
continued to advocate a state-regulated economy and higher taxation for the rich. It also
calls for free education, free health care, a 35-hour work-week, and measures against the
"Americanization" of Czech culture. The Communist party wants to review controversial
privatization, stop privatization, and reverse the deregulation of rents and utility costs. It
did not support the process of joining NATO. 275
Because the declaration was kept secret, even after a meeting of CSSD and
coalition party leaders with the Czech president in fall 1996, the Communists threatened
people that there was probably something wrong with the declaration if the government
did not want to tell people what it was about. They admitted that they would not be
against the declaration it there was condemnation of the so-called "wild transfer", but
they would be against it if post-war transfer was generally condemned. 276
Czech Communists had a strongly nationalized and anti-German attitude. They
expressed Palacky's view of history "... which found in Palacky's emphasis on the Czech-
German struggle a convenient ideological validation for its presentation of German
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revanschism and the international imperialism of NATO (in which Germany played a
prominent role) as perpetual threat to the socialist order."
277
One of the points of the Communist program for 1996 elections was the denial of
demands of Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft and similar pressures made by the
German government to reject Benes's decrees, the Potsdam Agreement, and other results
of World War n. 278 The Communist program mentioned a refusal to apologize to
Germany for the transfer, a refusal of any negotiations with Sudeten Germans, and a
request for compensation from Germany. 279
The Communists played to national sentiment in their opposition to the
declaration. Because they met with ordinary people during their meetings in different
towns and villages they knew about the fear of Sudeten Germans, and loss of property.
Additionally, Communist supporters include people with a lower level of education, a
tendency to totalitarian conceptions with stress on the strong role of state and only small
importance on freedom of individuals, and a dissatisfaction with government policy,280
therefore Communists could easily spread their anti-declaration ideas and threats.
Resulting from the Communist Party policy and an endeavor to attract more supporters,
Communists opposed the declaration process. They considered the transfer of Germans as
an act of justice, saying that the declaration facilitated Sudeten Germans demands, and
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threatened sovereignty of the Czech Republic. 281 They also criticized the government
coalition for wanting to approve the declaration and not foreseeing the consequences.
Communists were clearly against the declaration and started to gather signatures on a
petition against the declaration. They wanted to finish the signature collecting with a
demonstration on 30 January 1997, and ask the parliament to disapprove the
declaration.
282 They stated that Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft used good clever
tactics to confuse people in the Czech Republic, when it expressed disappointment with
the declaration. They also accused coalition parties and Social Democrats of
collaboration politics.
283 Communist parliament members proposed postponing the
declaration ratification. They were supported by demonstration against the Czech-
284German declaration outside the parliament, but the parliament refused their proposal.
President Havel denied meeting with representatives of the Communist Party and
accused the Communist Party together with the Republican Party of consciously and with
purposely harming the Czech Republic because of their behavior in connection with the
Czech-German declaration. 285
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ikany a komunisty skudci statu, (Havel Named Republicans and Communists as
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Communist parliament members also showed their attitudes towards the
declaration, when they boycotted a speech by German President Herzog at the Prague
Castle, saying that the declaration is only a governmental matter.
A Communist parliament member in the Foreign Committee, Miroslav Ransdorf,
voted against the decision to approve the declaration in parliament, because he said that
the declaration should remain only at the governmental level and the parliament should
not approve it.
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6. The Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia
(SRP-RSC)
The Republican Party was founded in December 1989. It is an extremely
nationalistic right-wing party, which has huge support among young skinhead groups. It
calls for radical restriction on state intervention in the economy as well as on foreign
business in the Czech Republic, lowering taxes, declaration of the neutrality and refusal
to join NATO. The Republican Party is also against joining the European Union.287 It is
against any negotiation with Germany about compensation for Sudeten Germans
transferred from Czechoslovakia after World War II. The SRP-RSC also wants free
education and social benefits, reintroduction of the death penalty, restriction of
immigration, absolute prohibition of production, distribution, and use of drugs.
The Republicans were disseminating false information about the declaration
during the entire negotiation period. For example, they created and distributed the paper
with allegedly secret information from negotiations where Czech coalition parties
286
MatouSkova, Mark6ta, "Poslanci doporucili pfijeti deklarace, (Parliamentarians Recommended
Approving of the Declaration)," Lidov6 noviny, 25 January 1997.
287 »SPR.RSc
>
(Association for Republic)," Lidov6 noviny, 13 April 1996.
121
prepared an agreement with Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft about the Sudeten
288German return.
The Republican Party stated in its program for 1996 elections that every politician
who would be negotiating Sudeten Germans return or rejecting Benes's decrees should be
condemned as a traitor. 28 ' It unambiguously refused the Czech-German declaration.
Republicans tried postponing the discussion about the declaration when they suggested
taking a break in the parliamentary meeting for 120 and then for 115 days.290 During the
discussion about the Czech-German declaration, they said that the declaration was the
first step for coalescence with "the Great German Reich" and for the end of the Czech
291
nation/* 1
Supporters of the SRP-RSC are typically egocentric people and only a few
supporters have university education. These people could be easily manipulated, so
Republicans could spread their views and opinions among them and get their support.29
When the declaration became public, Republicans condemned it and Mr. Vik, a
293
Republican parliament member, labeled it as "the great national tragedy."
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During German Chancellor Kohl's visit in the Czech Republic where he was
supposed to sign the declaration together with Czech Prime Minister Klaus, Republicans
organized a meeting outside the Liechtenstein Palace in Prague where the declaration
signing was taking place. After the Sladek's speech, in which he said that this was a new
Munich, demonstrators burned a German flag.
After 1998 elections, the Republican Party did not receive the needed five percent
to get into the Czech parliament. The Czech people expressed their disagreement with the
policy of this party.
All political parties used the fear of Sudeten Germans during the 1996 election
campaign, but they used it for different purposes and in a different way. The reason why
they used such fear was public opinion only showed only seven percent of the people
were willing to vote for a party, which would support an idea of apology to Sudeten
Germans. Contrary to this, eighty-six percent of people would not vote for such a
party.
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Republicans and Communist used their fear against the declaration to threaten
people with the danger of loosing their property. ODS argued the opposite way. It said
that if the declaration was not signed history would not be solved, and Sudeten Germans
might return. In April 1996, research was issued on how great the fear of Germany was
among Czech citizens. The results in table IV- 1 show what percent of voters of individual
parliamentary parties felt political, economical, and military threat from Germany.
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ODS (Civic Democratic Party) 31.3 24.0 14.7
ODA (Civic Democratic Alliance) 40.0 25.9 17.4
KDU-CSL (Christian Democrats) 51.9 39.8 24.7
CSSD (Social Democrats) 63.1 33.4 25.8
KSCM (Communist Party) 75.9 71.2 43.6
SPR-RPC (Republican Party) 66.4 60.0 34.3
Source: "Podil volicu jednotlivych stran, ktefl pocirujf obavy z Nemecka, (Percentage of voters of
Individual parties who fear of Germany)," Mladl fronta DNES, 9 April 1996, p.2.
C. GERMAN POLITICAL PARTIES AND MOVEMENTS
German political parties, in general, have a long history. Some of them resumed
their previous history from the middle of the last century, such as Social Democratic
Party. Some of them were created as a reaction to the "old parties' system" and are
relatively new on the political stage. After World War n, the German government and
party system were in disarray. German citizens feared concentration of power in one or
two parties in the system, similar to the American one; therefore, political power in
29 5Germany was divided into a diversity of political parties.
After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the successful completion of the
unification of Germany on 3 October 1990, political parties also established their regional
organization in the new eastern part of Germany extending their activities to that region.
Parties of the German Democratic Republic transformed themselves, like the former
"Politics and Post-War Germany," Available [Online]: <http://www.duke.edu/~hhayes/politics.html >,
Internet Explorer, [20 January 2000], p.l
.
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Communist Party (SED), which transformed itself into the Party of Democratic Socialism
(PDS), or created one common party with its West Germany counterpart; for instance, the
East German Alliance 90 and the Green Party from West Germany.
1. Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU)
The Christian Democratic Union was founded as a people's party after the
cruelties of World War II. The party did not want to represent a narrow interest of a
special limited group of people but wanted to gain wide support of a society. The CDU
was developed as a conservative-oriented party. The CDU operates in all German states
except Bavaria where its sister organization, the Christian Social Union, operates. The
CSU has similar political opinions with CDU and they have always formed a
parliamentary faction in the German Federal Parliament, the Bundestag.
The CDU/CSU was a long-time running governmental party. First, from 1949
until 1966 in coalition with the Free Democratic Party (FDP), and in 1966-69 forming a
"Great Coalition" with the Social Democrats (SPD). After years in opposition, it again
formed the Helmut Kohl led government coalition with the FDP from 1982 until 1998.
The CDU is a member of the European Peoples' Party (EPP). It says that now, after the
end of the Cold War, there is a chance for the whole of Europe to unite and to live in
freedom and democracy.296
The CDU/CSU preserves and strengthens the Christian-based values and
conservative economic principles. The CDU/CSU states that the basic guiding principle
for its political actions is the Christian view of man and the basic values of freedom,
solidarity and justice derived from this. They believe in the right of the individual to free
296
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development of his or her personality. In their point of view, solidarity means being there
for each other, because individuals and the community depend on this, and the basis for
justice is the principle of equality of all mankind in the dignity and freedom granted by
God.297 CDU stresses explicitly the virtues of a free, democratic state based on the rule of
law and an ecological and social market economy.
The tasks of the CDU/CSU are further development of the European Union,
ensuring lasting freedom in Europe, and strengthening the new democracies, which offers
an opportunity for creating a common European future. They want a strong Europe
ensuring the future of the nations. Europe must be able to take action where the
individual nation states are no longer able to solve the basic problems of their people. The
CDU sees as the most important task, achieving inner unity. Additionally, the economic,
social and ecological reconstruction of Eastern Germany is a priority.
The CSU claims itself - inter alia - as a representative of Sudeten Germans and as
a defender of their interests within the German parliament and government. 298 It tries to
enforce the interests of expelled Sudeten Germans in Bundestag. For example, in 1992
after signing the Agreement between Germany and Czechoslovakia, CSU enforced the
resolution in Bundestag in which Kohl's government would be tied on enforcing Sudeten
German interests towards Czechoslovakia.
The CDU/CSU says that Germans expelled from their homelands and German
minorities abroad fulfil an important function as bridges between nations. Germans who
"Principles and Programme of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany." 3 May 1999. Available
[Online]: <http://www.cdu.de/>, Internet Explorer, [15 January 2000], p.l.
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remained in their homelands can help to create friendly relations with people in that
299
region.
2. Social Democratic Party (SPD)
The Social Democratic Party is the party with a long history. It was founded in
1863. After National Socialists seized power in 1933, members of the SPD were arrested,
forced to exile, tortured, or even killed. In 1945, under the leadership of Kurt
Schumacher, who was categorically opposed to a merger with the communists, the SPD
began to rebuild its organization in' the Western zones. It also opposed Adenauer's
Western-oriented foreign policy after the World War n. The party represents interests of
the working class and wants to attract support from the middle class.
In 1966, the SPD participated in the Great Coalition created together with
CDU/CSU. After the 1969 elections, the Chairman of SPD, Willy Brandt, was elected as
the first Social Democratic Chancellor in post-war history. The SPD formed a
government coalition with FDP. In 1982, FDP left the social-liberal coalition and
provided the CDU/CSU with a majority in Bundestag, starting with the successful
"constructive vote of non-confidence" on 8 October of 1982. The SPD had to return to
the role of an opposition party. On 7 October 1990, the Social Democratic Party (SDP)
was founded in the GDR as an independent sister party to the SPD. Later, SPD adopted
SDP at all to form an united Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). The same year,
the SPD adopted its new Party Platform (Partei programm) in Berlin. 300
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Basic ideas of the SPD program are to settle conflicts without violence, to build a
society in which income is more justly distributed, to build an ecologically and socially
renewed economy that makes sparing use of nature energy forms, and to provide a
society of equality and solidarity for women and men, young and old, Germans and
foreigners ensuring a society in which citizens, wherever they feel affected, have an equal
301
say in making and implementing decisions.
The SPD, as a government party in 1966-1982, showed "understanding" for the
demands of Sudeten Germans, but in contrast to CDU/CSU, its support was not so strong
and it was not willing to threaten its "Ost-Politik" of Chancellor Willy Brandt because of
Sudeten German interests.
During the Czech-German declaration negotiation process, it criticized coalition
parties for trying to delay the process of reconciliation between both nations. These
attempts, especially made by CSU, threatened the creation of good relations with the
Czech Republic. 302 This party is close to Czech Social Democrats in opinions, so it was
willing to introduce the Czech Social Democrats accompanying resolution in Bundestag.
Nonetheless, this resolution was rejected.
Following the sixteen years as opposition in the Bundestag, as a result of the 1998
elections, the SPD formed the government coalition with the Alliance 90/Green Party and
changed its approached to the implementation of the Czech-German declaration. The
SPD member and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder said that the declaration
statement, not to encumber mutual relations with the past, meant that the past was
301 »5pD Basics." 17 February 2000. Available [Online]: <http://www.spd.de/english/basis.htm>, Internet
Explorer, [17 February 2000], p.l.
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closed.
303 He also said that the German federal government would not require any
property claims towards the Czech Republic. 304
3. Free Democratic Party (FDP)
In December 1948, delegates from liberal parties in the American, British, and
French occupation zones formed the Free Democratic Party (FDP), which advocates at
most individualism and free economic competition. Although it gained relatively small
voter support, it made and broke governments by forming coalitions with larger parties.
In the early 1950s, the FDP took part in the coalition government of the CDU/CSU. It left
the coalition in 1956 to join with the Social Democratic Party as an opposition party.
After the national elections in 1961, when the CDU/CSU lost their absolute majority, the
FDP executed the promise of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's resignation as the price of
its cooperation in a new coalition. The party's second withdrawal from government with
the Christian Democrats occurred in November 1966 when CDU/CSU and SPD formed a
"Great Coalition" leaving FDP the opposition role. After national elections in 1969, the
FDP joined a coalition with the SPD to form the government of SPD leader, Willy
Brandt. The FDP remained in coalition with the SPD until 1982, when it again formed a
coalition government with the CDU/CSU. The FDP played a leading role in German
foreign policy because its members, Walter Scheel (he later became German President),
Hans Dietrich Genscher, and Klaus Kinkel, executed the post of the German Foreign
Minister from 1969 to 1998.
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The Free Democrats, as the Christian Democrats, see themselves in the center of
the political spectrum. They support what Germans call the social market economy—
a
system of free enterprise combined with social welfare programs, such as national health
insurance, family allowances, pension, and support for unemployed and handicap
workers. These programs account for almost half the government's budget. They also
advocate close relations with the United States and supports membership in NATO and
the European Union.
4. Alliance '90/Green Party
The Green party is the major voice of Germany's environmentalist movement. It
was represented in the Bundestag from 1983 to 1990. It failed to win any seats in the
1990 elections, however it was in a coalition government with the SPD in a number of
the states.
After the unification of Germany, the West-German Green Party (Die Griinen), a
grassroots party formed in West Germany before unification, joined with the East-
German Alliance '90 (Bundnis 90), built from the various opposition groups which had
existed in the East German GDR.
The Alliance 90/Green Party joined the SPD and formed a government coalition
after 1998 elections. Its main program tasks are to enable a right for double citizenship, to
ensure equality of rights for women, and to fight against atomic power supply. The Green
Party has pacifistic attitudes in general, specifically towards the German Armed Forces,
and in general, does not support military participation abroad. Although Foreign Minister
and the Green Party member, Joschka Fischer, was, from the beginning, a strong
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supporter of the humanitarian mission in Kosovo, great discussions were held within the
party about German participation there. 305
The Green Party has some internal problems because it lost positions during the
last regional elections in 1999. It did not even reached the necessary limit to get in the
parliaments of four federal lands. Its members refused a reform of the party suggested by
the most influential member of the Green Party and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer. 306
Antje Vollmer, Deputy Chairperson of the Bundestag and Green Party member,
commented several times on CDU/CSU. She blamed Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft
and Bavarian CSU for making negotiation with the Czech Republic more difficult
because of their continuous new demands, and, therefore making the declaration
acceptance impossible.
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After the declaration ratification by the Czech Prime Minister
and the German Chancellor, she joined the group of politicians who asked the Czech side
for negotiations with Sudeten Germans.308
During the Czech-German declaration process, the Green Party was an opposition
party and its representatives did not speak a lot about the Sudeten German issue. After the
party joined a coalition with the SPD in 1998, it focused on enforcing its program and on
its own internal problems. The Czech-Sudeten German issue does not seem to be its main
issue of concern.
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5. Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS)
The history of the Communist party defers to West and East Germany. The
Communist Party (KPD) in West Germany was banned by the Constitutional Court in
1956, and as a reconstructed party, labeled the DKP began its activity in 1969. However
it did not attract great vote support. In East Germany, the Communist Party was
reorganized in 1945, and in 1946, Soviets forced unification of the Communist Party
(KPD) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) into the Socialist Unity Party of Germany
(SED). It became the ruling party and controlled the state.309
In 1989 after the collapse of the Communist regime, the SED party membership
shrank from 2.3 million to 105,000 members, and many local organizations disbanded
themselves. The party changed its name to PDS in February 1990, and new moderate
leaders took over. In the 1990 parliamentary election, the party received about sixteen
percent of the vote in the former East German territories, and a temporary change in
electoral law enabled PDS to obtain representation in Bundestag, although it gained less
than three percent nationwide.
The PDS gained about twenty percent of the votes in the eastern part of Germany
in federal elections in 1994 as well as in state elections. As a result of this, some SPD
representatives started to think about cooperation with the PDS and the so-called
"Magdeburg model" was created. 310 This model was confirmed after 1998 elections when
9
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310 Magdeburg is capital of Saxony-Anhalt. SPD created coalition with the Green Party and with the silent
support of PDS in this state. CDU/CSU was excluded from state government and decision-making process.
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cooperation between the SPD and the PDS continued in Saxony-Anhalt. The PDS
members are members of the state government in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania. 311
In its program, the PDS asks for shortening of working hours, ensuring the right
to work, establishing democratic control for the bank system, financing of public
beneficial labor, abolishing of conscript service, and the abolishing of NATO.
The PDS was and is an opposition party, which did not speak a lot about the
Sudeten German issue. This party did not even stress the suffering of expelled people
from the Eastern Europe based on Potsdam victorious power decision as other opposition
parties did during the Czech-German declaration creation process.
6. Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft (SL)
Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft is not a political party. It is an organization,
whose members are people transferred or expelled from Czechoslovakia in 1945-1946.
According to the polls from 1996, less then 100,000 Sudeten Germans, more than eight
percent of all Sudeten Germans in Bavaria, are members of the Sudetendeutsche
Landsmannschaft. 312 In the beginning of 1960s, German political parties issued
statements in which they recognized Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft as a legitimate
organization representing expelled Sudeten Germans. 313
Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft gains its power from strong cooperation with
the Bavarian CSU due to the fact that many CSU representatives are, at the same time,
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Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft members. The SL as well as CSU members are; for
example: Hans Klein, Deputy Chairman of Bundestag in 1994-1998; the present SL
Chairman Bernd Posselt is a member of the European parliament; the present SL speaker,
Johann Bohm, is chairman of the Bavarian parliament.
Goals of the SL concerning the Czech Republic (CR) are:
1. The CR should declare the expulsion of the Sudeten German to be an
international crime.
2. The Sudeten Germans should be given the right to their homeland. This
includes the right to return and the right to live there as Germans.
3. The Benes decrees and some other post-war law, as far as they concern the
expulsion of Germans and Hungarians should be abolished.
4. Direct negotiations between Czech officials and the leadership of the
Landsmannschaft should be started. During these negotiations all problems
concerning the future coexistence of Czechs and Germans in the Bohemian
Lands/Czech Republic should be discussed and settled.
This organization criticized the 1992 German-Czechoslovakian Treaty on good
neighborhood and friendly cooperation, because it did not provide any kind of
compensation for expulsion, expropriation, forced labor, and mass killings. It criticized
also the Czech-German declaration signed in 1997 for the same reasons.
Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft required the above mentioned demands and,
together with the Bavarian CSU, wanted the Czech side to admit that the German
transfer, approved by victorious powers in Potsdam, was basically expulsion. 314 The
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leader of Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft, Mr. Franz Neubauer criticized the Czech
side, during the entire period of negotiations on the declaration saying that it was not
willing to compromise. 315
After the declaration was ratified, Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft
representatives, with support form members of the Bavarian CSU, said that in connection
with Czech membership in the European Union, they would use every opportunity to
enforced Sudeten Germans' interests. 316
German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder, during the meeting with Czech Prime
Minister Zeman in March 1999, stated that "agreement not to encumber mutual relations
with the past means that the past is closed."
317 The leader of Sudetendeutsche
Landsmannschaft, Mr. Neubauer, rejected this statement and called for Schroder's
resignation. According to Neubauer, Chancellor Schroder gave up Germany's and
Sudeten German's interests.
D. CONCLUSION
Almost all of the Czech political parties support the idea of the EU membership of
the Czech Republic. To reach this goal, Czech political parties should not only focus their
effort on domestic economic and political reforms to fulfill EU requirements, but also try
to solve issues which could be obstacles in the effort to join the EU.
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Czech Social Democrats stated in their program that they would not discuss the
Potsdam Agreement issue, but want to create good relations with Czech neighbors and
are open to all other areas of concern. Also Czech former government coalition parties,
the ODS, the ODA, and the KDU-CSL, want to develop friendly relations with other
nations, especially with neighbors. As programs and policies of individual Czech parties
showed, only Communists and Republicans have not been willing to negotiate with
Germany and Sudeten Germans to contribute to the solving of Czech-German issue.
German Social Democrats contributed to the present stage of Czech-German
relations by a statement made by German Chancellor Schroder in March 1999. They are
willing to negotiate with the Czech Republic to shift mutual relations further towards
better cooperation and final solution of the Czech-German issue. Negotiations with the
CDU/CSU are also possible, but this party is limited because of its ties with and
obligations to Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Czech Republic went through a ten-year long process of transition to
democracy. It succeeded in creating a democratic political system, adopting a new
constitution, and changing the state central controlled economy into a market economy. It
successfully established good political and economic relations with Western democracies.
The Czech Republic finally became a NATO member in March 1999 after accomplishing
the needs and prerequisitions as set in the NATO accession talks. After achieving its goal
to become part of the Western political and military defense structure, the Czech
Republic, furthermore, wishes to be integrated into the political and economic structures
of the European Union and to become its member.
The issue of the Czech-Sudeten German relations ran through the entire ten-year
period of Czech post-communist history. Czech president Vaclav Havel initiated a very
difficult path towards the final Czech-German reconciliation by his apology to the
expelled Sudeten Germans in 1990. However, the Czechoslovak-German Agreement in
1992 did not consider or solve anything in the Czech-Sudeten German "dispute";
therefore, the creation of the Czech-German common declaration was initialized in 1995.
The Czech side thought the declaration would solve the entire issue and complete or close
all problems of the German transfer from Czechoslovakia in 1945-46. However, during
the negotiations of the declaration text, different opinions; for example, on the Potsdam
Agreement, endured. Unfortunately, even the declaration itself did not help very much to
improve mutual relations. It did not mention the problems of the Potsdam Agreement or
the Allies' support for the transfer, so different opinions remained. All negotiations were
137
conducted secretly without informing the public or even parliament members. This
helped such forces as the Czech Republican Party and the Communist Party, and the
German Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft (SL) respectively, to spread rumors. The SL
claimed that the German government wanted to give up the right of compensation for the
Sudeten Germans. On the Czech side, Republicans and Communists spread rumors that
the Czech government wanted to sell the country and enable the Sudeten Germans to
return with the possibility of getting their property back. This only enhanced fear in the
Czech population causing the level of support for the declaration difficult to increase.
Additionally, no one could reach any agreement on the term "displacement" of Germans
from Czechoslovakia in 1945-46. The Czech and German versions of the declaration
used different words for that event, so in an extreme position of interpretation, someone
could say that there were two different documents. A statement made by German
Chancellor Helmut Kohl, after the procedure of signing the declaration that Sudeten
German claims were still open, returned all process of reconciliation "two years back"
and froze Czech optimism.
After early elections held in the Czech Republic in June 1998, the Social
Democratic Party, the strongest party according to election results, formed a minority
government. The German Social Democratic Party also won elections in Germany in
September 1998 and, consequently, formed a government coalition with the Green
Party/Alliance 90. A March 1999 meeting of Social Democratic leaders and at the same
time German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder and Czech Prime Minister Milos Zeman
confirmed close attitudes of both Social Democratic parties towards the Czech-Sudeten
German issue. The German Chancellor stated that the agreement not to encumber mutual
138
relations with the past, reached by signing the declaration in 1997, meant the past is
definitively closed.
318 He also said that claims of expellee organizations did not have any
influence on German foreign policy. He added that the support for the Czech EU
membership was without any prerequisites and the German federal government would
not claim any property rights towards the Czech Republic. The Czech Prime Minister, on
behalf of the Czech Republic government, said that some legal norms passed after 1945,
which were maintained within the Czech legal system, had become extinct.319 By this
statement, he indirectly distanced himself from the Benes's decrees.
Leaders of both CSU Bundestag members and of the Sudetendeutsche
Landsmannschaft representatives criticized the German Chancellor for not having any
right to give up the rights of expellees. It was obvious that Mr. Schroder's statement alone
did not solve the issue of the Sudeten German property claims because future German
governments can deal with it in a totally different way than the present government does.
His statements were not backed by a parliamentary decision. It was clear that the
CDU/CSU had different opinions on this issue. If the CDU/CSU coalition formed the
next German government, the approach to this problem would be different, and what Mr.
Schroder said would not hold.
The actual situation of winter 1999/2000 has been quite calm because of current
attitudes shared by both Social Democratic Parties presently in government. But there are
still requirements of the Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft, and its demands are
318
Palata, LuboS, "Jistotu Schroder Praze d&t nemohl, (Schroder Could Not Give the Certainty to Prague),"
Mlada fironta DNES, 10 March 1999.
319
Palata, LuboS, "Zeman a Schroder udSlali tecku za tSzkou minulosu', (Zeman and Schroder Made a
Period After the Difficult Past)," Mlada" fronta DNES, 9 March 1999.
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conditioned on allowing the Czech Republic to join the EU. Even the EU itself asked the
Czech Republic to accommodate its legal documents to current EU norms and standards.
Additionally, these parties did not have to be government parties at the time of the
European Union enlargement. This is very probable in the case of Czech Social
Democrats who presently get only between ten and fifteen percent of vote support.320 It
means that the Sudeten German issue has to be solved rather sooner than later, if the
Czech Republic wants to become an EU member and live without disputes with its
western neighbor.
A. WHAT THE CZECH REPUBLIC SHOULD DO TO SOLVE THE
SUDETEN GERMAN ISSUE
The Czech Republic has to show it is a consolidated democracy. The Czech
Republic wants to solve all its old disputes and quarrels, and it is not constrained by the
old communist regime opinions, assumptions, and myths. The main areas of concern are
mentioned below. These areas should cover the entire scale of possible topics which are
related to the Sudeten German question while finding a solution which would contribute
to the overall reconciliation process. So, the Czech Republic should address these areas to
solve the Czech-Sudeten German issue and to be closer to a European Union
membership:
1) To conclude the Czech-German declaration as an international
agreement
The Czech side should try to create and to sign a new declaration or agreement
about the Czech-Sudeten German relations which would be concluded as an international
"° Preferences of Social Democtats went down through last months. It received 12.1 percent in October,
11.8 percent in November, and according to Sofres-Factum agency only 9.8 percent in December. In last
polls, it received 12.4 percent. Lipoid, Jan, "Na zmene volebnfho zlkona nemusi jeji autofi vydSlat, (The
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treaty. After the signing of the Czech-German declaration in 1997, there were voices
against the declaration saying that it was not a binding document, because it was only a
parliamentary declaration and not an international treaty. Therefore an international treaty
would be a legal document without any ambiguity as long as one or another side followed
it, otherwise, it would be only a gesture without any legal consequences. Mr. Michael
Steiner, chief advisor on foreign affairs within the German Chancellor's office, expressed
the German side's willingness to sign some kind of a new declaration. He said that he
thought about "the declaration number two" which should shift the Czech-German
relations from war, transfer, and property claims to the present questions.
2) To inform the Parliament and public about the current stage of
negotiation.
Discussions and negotiations about the declaration process have to be made
openly, and both sides have to inform politicians and the public about the current level or
stage of negotiations. It helps to disable opponents of the declaration by preventing the
spread of rumors. If the negotiations are secret and their results are available only to a
limited number of people it contributes to people or political parties which want to
distract every process and turn the public opinion eventually against any kind of a new
document.
3) To avoid a different interpretation of history or term disaccord.
The Czech side has to finish with its stubbornness not to accept the term
expulsion and agree on a term which describes the process of expulsion, transfer,
displacement, or forced resettlement of German people from Czechoslovak territory after
World War n. Both versions of the declaration, German and Czech, must be identical in
change of the electoral system does not have to be beneficial for its creators)," Mlad£ fronta DNES, 20
January 2000.
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wording and meaning, and be agreed on by both sides with no other "single sided"
interpretation made possible due to different language meaning.
4) To settle president Benes's decrees issue.
President Benes's decrees can be divided into two categories or groups. The first
group consists of decrees that should be abolished. Decree 115/1946, "Unlawful behavior
connected to the fight of Czechs and Slovaks for retrieval of freedom" from 8 May 1946,
belongs to this group. This decree covers the period of the so-called "wild transfer" after
the end of World War II, and, therefore, unlawful actions committed during that period. It
is not a good mark for a democratic country to have a valid law, which apologizes for
crimes. Decree 33/1945 addressing Czechoslovak citizenship for people of German or
Hungarian nationality can be another decree in this first group. If they did not ask for
Czech or Slovak nationality, it deprived Germans and Hungarians of their Czechoslovak
citizenship without any difference, only because of their nationality. At least these two
decrees should be abolished in any case.
Decrees with the main purpose of punishing active members of fascist
organizations, members of SS units, and traitors, specifically mentioning period of time, a
circumstances, and persons considered to be eligible for that decree, belong to the second
group. These decrees were legally issued and were a legitimate act at that time. Because
these decrees fulfilled their purpose and were not in use for more than forty years, and as
Czech Prime Minister Milos Zeman said they are "legally extinct", there is no need to
keep them within the Czech legal system. Their abatement will not mean threatening of
the legal certainty for the Czech people.
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On the other hand, it has to be cleared to the German side that none of the Benes's
decrees consists of any statement or deals for expulsion of German people from
Czechoslovakia. Therefore, making any connection between Benes's decrees and the
German transfer is misleading.
5) To start dialogue with Sudeten German representatives.
The Czech Republic should start direct negotiations or talks with the Sudeten
Germans. First, it should forget about the old prejudice of the Sudeten Germans being
equal with the Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft. It is only one of the many
organizations representing rights and demands of transferred or expelled Sudeten
Germans. Dialogue between the Czech government and representatives of the Sudeten
Germans would not mean discussion only with representatives of the Sudetendeutsche
Landsmannschaft. There are other organizations which represent interests of Sudeten
Germans, such as Seliger Society, Ackermann Society, and Collegium Carolinum (which
is not strictly a Sudeten German organization, but many Sudeten Germans have close ties
with it). Discussion would not bring any risk to the Czech Republic, but this would result
in loss of one of the argument from the Sudeten German side about the Czech Republic
being non-cooperative and unwilling to talk about unfavorable topics.
It is not possible to change the past. If the past is seen from a purposely-focused
point of view, or from the nationalistic perspective, then the accord or agreement is very
hard to reach. Unfortunate historical events should not be reasons for new injustice. If
both sides are willing to discuss and to compromise, a solution could be completed.
Nevertheless, they have to make clear and non-ambiguous statements, which could not be
misused. Cooperation between the Czech Republic and the Federative Republic of
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Germany should be based on mutual positive facts from history and positive present
relations, and not on the lawlessness committed in the past.
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